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THE 1972 MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION DECLARATION 





As the 1971 Montana State Legislature was winding down—
where I had worked for Chairman Luke McKeon as staff at the Senate 
Executive Reorganization Committee—I was hired, age 21, to research 
civil liberties and political freedoms for the newly created Montana Con-
stitutional Convention Commission.  My scope included potential envi-
ronmental quality provisions because they were at the time widely viewed 
as matters of rights and obligations, and the related ability of citizens to 
seek adjudication of them. 
For all those hired by Executive Director Dale Harris, this was an 
unexpected opportunity and came with a clear sense of stern responsibili-
ties.  I settled in with a group of highly talented colleagues, including the 
likes of the scholarly Bruce Sievers, James Grady (then still pre-Condor1 
and before his investigative reporting days with Jack Anderson), Roger 
Barber, Rich Bechtel, Sandra Muckleston, and others. 
We quickly found ourselves wondering if we had just accepted the 
best jobs we might have in our lifetimes; and whether anything that fol-
lowed could possibly measure up.  At the same time, we dreaded that we 
could fail spectacularly at this; that we might not be able to get the neces-
sary work done on time and at sufficiently high quality. 
In those days, now nearly 50 years ago, I was given a very large 
room up in what I called the Far North, right behind the House gallery in 
the Montana Capitol building.  Cavernous, without hint of a window, it 
felt like it was my personal double-wide tomb.  It housed two massive 
tables, and, in a far-off corner, I stowed my rawhide moccasins that did 
not lend an elegant ambience to the place. 
I spread out separate piles, chapters, one to a table—sections of 
what became a rather bloated draft tome destined for the delegates—edited 
fortunately by the fine hand of Jerry Holloron, the acclaimed journalist 
who served as Assistant Director.  Lord knows, my writing needed his 
help, as this entire exercise was research conducted and written at a young 
 
1.  Grady’s popular novel, Six Days of the Condor, was published in 
1974.  
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age, in what felt like a wind tunnel test.  We had so much to do, and so 
little time to get it done.2 
We were laboring under the watchful eyes of the Convention 
Commission—an esteemed group of Montana’s senior overseers who re-
viewed and met regularly to discuss our emerging ideas and work prod-
ucts.  Names like Alexander Blewett, Eugene Mahoney, Ty Robinson, 
Bruce Toole, William Sternhagen, Charles Harrington, Dr. Ellis Waldron, 
and more were spread across the Commission’s letterhead. 
They did not intrude in our work, but their presence was surely 
felt.  They made certain we were on track and that the research fairly laid 
out the broad range of available issues for the soon-to-be-elected delegates 
to the Constitutional Convention.  We were charged to dig up, synthesize, 
and flesh out any and all leading matters we could find that might be con-
sidered and perhaps adopted in some form in the draft Constitution—po-
tentially to be tested in what was supposed to be one among the widespread 
experiments in state constitutions then sweeping the country.3 
In addition to my office, I was able to take over a table in Kathe-
rine Orchard’s state law library, then tucked down a narrow corridor be-
hind the old Supreme Court chamber, where in my earlier days as a State 
Senate page in 1967, I frequently observed Justices Doyle and Adair more 
than briefly dozing off during the practiced and honed arguments of coun-
sel vying for the Court’s attention. 
To help with my Constitutional Convention research, Ms. Orchard 
provided me with a key so I could show up in the wee hours and, if needed, 
stay after dark to plough through the materials that would help inform the 
Convention deliberations.  She looked away when in the mornings I 
wolfed down a couple powdered sugar donuts, hard-boiled eggs, and car-
tons of milk from the basement cafeteria while I raked through mounds of 
legal and policy analyses.  The rules were pack it in, pack it out, and leave 
no crumbs behind.  Anywhere. 
 
WHY EVEN HAVE A STATE CONSTITUTION DECLARATION OF RIGHTS? 
AND WHAT SORTS OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS MIGHT BELONG IN ONE?  
 
First, to the why.  This was one of the initial questions addressed 
at the beginning of my study, where I pointed out that in the 18th century, 
a number of colonies, later to become states, had declarations of rights 
 
2. RICK APPLEGATE, BILL OF RIGHTS, MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION COMMISSION, REP. NO. 10, 1972.  After 422 pages, a dedicated reader 
would stagger into the Selected Bibliography. 
3.  NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE,  MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION (6th 
ed. 1963). 
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well before the United States Constitution was adopted and Congress met 
to add the ten amendments that eventually became the first federal Bill of 
Rights.4  
In fact, several of those colonies made it clear that a bill of rights 
of some kind was important to their willingness to ratify the new Consti-
tution.  Above all, many were concerned that the newly strengthened fed-
eral government would need to be restrained by a federal bill of rights. 
James Madison borrowed extensively from the various guarantees 
then in place—for example, from Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware.  
And, recognizing that the federal bill of rights would not be a complete list 
of all-important rights, he included an explicit unenumerated rights provi-
sion as the federal Ninth Amendment.  It provided: “The enumeration in 
the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or dispar-
age others retained by the people.”5 
Beyond that, there was a general sense that all levels of govern-
ment should be engaged in propounding additional rights—discovering 
and advancing the limits on governmental actions and also reining in the 
whims of majorities that might otherwise overrun the legitimate interests 
of vulnerable minorities. 
Of course, later in the history of the Bill of Rights, it became clear 
that the federal government had to step in to set some minimum standards 
where the states had failed—for example, the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amend-
ments were necessary to guarantee the end of slavery; enshrine due process 
of law; cement the privileges and immunities of citizenship; and provide 
for the equal protection of the laws as resistance and retrenchment contin-
ued for decades after the Civil War. 
In spite of historical efforts to recast the Civil War as simply a 
matter of states generally asserting their rights against an overly intrusive 
federal government, it was a fundamental right—the right to be free from 
forced enslavement, family separation, and sale—that led to the tragic ca-
tastrophe of internal war.  It was never to be an easy march away from that 
legacy; for as we know, the resistance to the abolition of slavery and to 
new civil rights was reinvigorated after the war.  Indeed, it has persisted 
in various forms to the present day in a variety of creatively designed state 
and federal legislative efforts adversely affecting minorities, particularly 
but not only, in some of the states that once comprised the Confederacy.6 
In addition, over time, given the overwhelming complexities, dif-
ficulties, and the daunting and time-consuming nature of the process for 
 
4.  U.S. CONST. amend. I-X. 
5.  U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
6.  HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., STONY THE ROAD: RECONSTRUCTION, 
WHITE SUPREMACY, AND THE RISE OF JIM CROW (2019). 
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amending the United States Constitution, states have often been consid-
ered to be useful laboratories for experimentation with new rights that may 
be vetted before being offered for addition to the federal Bill of Rights or 
otherwise reflected in some way in federal law.  Perhaps the best-known 
example of this testing ground can be seen in the fact that a number of 
territories and states had adopted full or partial women’s suffrage prior to 
that change being added to the Constitution.7 
In my study, I also discussed the frequently expressed view that 
state constitution provisions should, in contrast to statutes, be kept short in 
the interest of clarity and conciseness.  However, I urged that “a sound 
declaration of rights is not necessarily short, nor should its provisions all 
be approximately the same number of words.”8  What I meant was that 
circumstances might indicate the need for more expansive expressions of 
an emerging right, as opposed to artificially abbreviated provisions. 
Second, was the question of what kinds of rights and freedoms 
might need to be covered.  It is frequently asserted that declarations of 
rights are primarily designed to protect individual citizens from intrusive 
governmental agencies and officials.  And that is true.  Those protections 
certainly are fundamental and important bulwarks, here and worldwide, as 
has been amply established over and over.  And the protection of the indi-
vidual from government excess is a key original purpose of declarations 
of rights in the U.S. experience.  In my work on civil liberties and political 
freedoms, and in the work with the delegates, we recognized that was just 
one of the reasons a right or freedom might be declared in a bill of rights. 
In my early briefings on my study for the Committee, and as we 
worked our way through the many issues in my report, there emerged a 
clear understanding that we should broaden the focus to three other cate-
gories of protections and opportunities meriting coverage—that is, if we 
could fashion relevant provisions.  And the search for those, the discovery 
of some of them, is part of the reason that the Montana Declaration of 
Rights stands as more than an appealing novelty and has for so many years. 
 
7.  In 1872, Susan B. Anthony registered and voted in Rochester, New 
York.  She was convicted without a jury trial and fined $100, which she never paid.  
In 1875, women in Michigan and Minnesota obtained the right to vote in school elec-
tions.  Between 1869 and 1883, the territories of Wyoming, Utah and Washington 
granted women full voting rights;  see also ELEANOR FLEXNER & ELLEN FITZPATRICK, 
CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
(3rd revised ed. 1959); and, for a deeper dive into the lives of the leading activists, see 
ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, ET AL., WOMEN OF THE SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT: MEMOIRS 
AND BIOGRAPHIES OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL SUFFRAGETTES (2018). 
8.   APPLEGATE, supra note 2, at 4. 
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The second critical feature of declarations of rights, beyond the 
important protection of citizens against governmental excesses, is the 
more difficult but equally critical matter of shielding vulnerable minorities 
and others from the sometimes-runaway intentions of unrestrained, even 
voracious majorities, which in our history have frequently pushed the le-
gitimate grievances and claims of minorities, indigenous people, and many 
others—generally the least advantaged among us—to the curb.  Protec-
tions of this kind are found, for example in the broader than usual anti-
discrimination, equal protection, and individual dignity provisions of the 
Montana declaration. 
Third, it is increasingly important to protect individuals and 
groups from the expanding and overwhelming power of the private sector, 
which can be even more damaging to civil liberties and political freedoms 
than the public sector.  Private sector intrusion was also squarely addressed 
in the anti-discrimination, equal protection, and dignity provisions. 
A fourth important aspect of civil liberties and political freedoms 
in a bill of rights is the matter of laying the foundations, better yet, estab-
lishing the fundamental prerequisites for effective citizenship—something 
that has received insufficient attention in our polity.  These days, it shows. 
The adopted Declaration of Rights did make some progress in 
each of the four areas above.  However, as will be seen below, much work 
remains if there is the political will and if the opportunities arise.  
 
WHAT MAKES THE MONTANA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS SO SPECIAL? 
 
Let’s just get the obvious and easy part out of the way: the 1972 
Montana Constitution Declaration of Rights stands as a marvelous and 
surprising collection of innovative provisions—more novel and powerful 
than virtually anything that can be found in constitutions anywhere—even 
to this day.  Going in, no one expected or could have predicted that kind 
of outcome.  I wrote my study hoping to break a lot of new ground, but 
really had no idea we would end up with so much that was compelling, 
new, and in some cases unique.  Or that it would become a lasting example 
of what we know in the national pastime as long ball.9 
 
9.  See, e.g., SAUL K. PADOVER, SOURCES OF DEMOCRACY: VOICES OF 
FREEDOM, HOPE, AND JUSTICE (1973) (identifying collected documents central to the 
history of democracy.  He was teaching at the Graduate Faculty of the New School 
for Social Research in New York City when I returned to my studies in the fall of 1972 
with Dr. Robert Heilbroner and Dr. Hannah Arendt after the Constitutional Conven-
tion.  Not surprisingly, Padover’s book concluded with the Montana Declaration of 
Rights as the latest in his sweeping compilation of the key documents in the history of 
democracy.  He was very impressed with it.). 
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Take the highlights in order: 
 
1. An inalienable right to a clean and healthful environ-
ment (laid out in the Bill of Rights study; and, while not 
found in the original Bill of Rights Committee proposal, 
fortunately added in a rather abrupt and surprising move 
by Delegate Burkhardt as a Convention floor amend-
ment). 
 
2. The inalienable right to pursue life’s basic necessities, 
including a right to pursue, among other things, an indi-
vidual’s safety and health.10 
 
3. Broad equal protection and anti-discrimination provi-
sions that explicitly prohibit discrimination—not only by 
government, but by persons, firms, or institutions; in 
short, any discrimination that would limit the exercise of 
civil or political rights, whether based on race, color, sex, 
culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious 
views.  And a guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 
 
4. An individual dignity provision, at the time seemingly 
innocuous, but still holding the promise of yet-to-be-dis-
covered potential. 
 
5. The right of participation, which remains unique in 
state constitutions (with an important, somewhat experi-
ment-undercutting qualifier adopted during floor consid-
eration that unfortunately declares it a right “as may be 
provided by law”). 
 
6.  The now-famous right to know—providing public ac-
cess to documents and deliberations—constrained only 
when the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds 
the merits of public disclosure. 
 
7. An explicit right of individual privacy (unlike the 
United States Constitution where that right was pulled by 
 
10. MONT. CONST., art. II, § 3. 
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the U.S. Supreme Court from the shadow, the “penum-
bra” of the existing federal Bill of Rights).11 
 
8. A clear and direct statement of the right of suffrage, the 
right to vote, which is not to be impaired (again, unlike 
the United States Constitution which is more narrowly fo-
cused when it comes to its provisions on suffrage; and is 
in my view much less clear and ultimately nowhere near 
as helpful as it should be for voters in a democratic repub-
lic—especially when we see restrictions that historically 
have been and in contemporary times are still being em-
ployed to weaken that right by suppressing voting and 
turnout for what smack of largely partisan ends). 
 
9. A provision guaranteeing to persons under the age of 
majority the same rights as those available to adults.12 
 
10. A promising statement that the principles of the crim-
inal justice system are to prevent crime, promote refor-
mation, public safety, and restitution—and not simply to 
impose punishment or exact harsh retribution. 
 
11. The restoration of full rights to convicted persons 
upon completion of their term of supervision (including 
the crucial restoration of the right to vote, a reform that 
Montana has had in place for decades but remains now 
and for the foreseeable future a matter of considerable 
controversy in many states).13 
 
12. Originally, as adopted and ratified as part of the 1972 
Constitution, the total elimination of the governmental de-
fense against lawsuits, the claim-snuffing doctrine of 
 
11.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also, Larry Elison 
& Dennis Nettik Simmons, Right of Privacy, 48 MONT. L. REV. (1987). 
12.  APPLEGATE, supra note 2, at 33; Rebecca Stursberg, Still-In-Flux: 
Reinterpreting Montana’s Rights-of-Minors Provision, 79 MONT. L. REV. 259 (2018). 
13.  This is one of those instances when I find that Wikipedia has some of 
the most concise, accessible and informative material on the subject; see “Felony Dis-
enfranchisement in the United States” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Felony_disen-
franchisement_in_the_United_States.  The state of Florida has recently voted 
statewide to re-enfranchise convicted felons, but even passage of the measure by a 
substantial margin has not stopped efforts to continue at least some of the difficulties 
of re-instatement of this fundamental right. 
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“sovereign immunity”—an anachronistic vestige of the 
old notion from royal Europe that “the King can do no 
wrong.”  The provision was of course subsequently 
amended by statewide referendum to allow exceptions—
renewing immunities from suit if specifically adopted by 
a supermajority vote of the state legislature. 
 
13. The repetition of the venerable, still helpful, and ex-
plicit recognition that there exist other unenumerated 
rights that are retained by citizens. 
 
AS THE CONVENTION KICKED OFF . . . 
 
At one point, fairly early on, long before any of the Constitution’s 
provisions were hardening into a proposed Declaration of Rights or other 
articles in the document, several of us on the Convention staff felt that the 
delegates were focusing too much on only those matters that would almost 
certainly pass muster with the voters—based on a loosely developed intu-
ition about what Montanans would willingly absorb or tolerate.  So, in a 
fit of youthful exuberance, not to say recklessness, we had the unbridled 
audacity to say so; and we did it publicly.  Live on air, of all things.  Of 
course, some of our good friends in the media relished the dust-up that 
seemed certain to follow. 
Waking to what we had just done, we basically hastened to duck 
and cover, waiting for an expected terminal blowback.  In that, we were 
disappointed (happily I recall, as we suspected we had stepped into a pile 
that was far over the line).  But, for the most part, we were greeted with 
relative silence and even a bit of encouraging agreement by close associ-
ates and among some of the delegates.  And, fortunately, thanks to the 
equanimity of all delegates, and the harried seriousness of their delibera-
tions, there were to my knowledge no significant recriminations of any 
kind—either discussed or threatened. 
We and the delegates went back to work, and, over time, it ap-
peared that they were, not because of our mini mutiny, in fact perfectly 
comfortable considering nearly every matter we lobbed their way.  Some 
key items made it in; some did not.  But all had their moment in the delib-
erations in the various committees and on the floor—and certainly in the 
work of the Bill of Rights Committee, which of course, I observed as 
closely as anyone could have hoped to. 
In the course of all that, I developed an enduring admiration for 
the workings of the Committee members in their deliberations and in par-
ticular the skills of the Committee Chairman Wade Dahood, who, while 
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we did not always agree, was a master of his craft, and a formidable advo-
cate for many civil liberties and political freedoms as he understood them 
at the time.  I have described elsewhere his habit of gripping someone’s 
arm as he was making a point on a matter of constitutional law.  And as 
the conversation proceeded, that person soon enough realized that Wade’s 
grip was becoming more intense, and that he was not likely to relax or 
release it until you agreed with him—or he was summoned by other duties.  
I recall most of those discussions I had with him fondly to this day, and 
the circulation in my arm is back in the normal range. 
The Committee members decided at the outset to avoid diminish-
ing any existing right or freedom in the Montana Constitution.  They then 
moved through proposals to develop language and on to the Committee’s 
overall report.  Without a hint of partisanship, the Committee’s votes on 
individual proposals were nearly all unanimous.14  
The other Convention delegates likewise marched efficiently on 
through their committee work, floor deliberations, style and drafting re-
views, numerous votes, and eventually to a signing ceremony in which the 
approved document was autographed by all the delegates—even if some 
held reservations that would lead them ultimately to oppose ratification of 
the Constitution. 
 
THE FLOOR DEBATES 
 
The floor debates on the proposed Declaration of Rights unleashed 
considerable anxiety on my part as the draft was about to be subjected to 
detailed scrutiny—and the will of the delegates would be the final word 
on what would be presented to the voters for ratification or rejection, at 
which point, as occurred in other states, it could all be for naught.15 
 
 
14.  MONTANA CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE 
REPORT, 1972. 
15.  State constitution ratification failed in New York in 1967, in Rhode 
Island in 1968, and, to the surprise of many, in Maryland, in that same troubled and 
disorienting year.  Many of the delegates to the Montana Constitutional Convention 
were acutely aware of those failures to ratify, and feared Montana's document might 
easily suffer the same fate.  But many told me directly that they were not deterred in 
any way by that record and intended to pull together and offer the best provisions they 
could find.  Often they did just that.  For broad overviews of the Declaration of Rights, 
see LARRY ELISON AND FRITZ SNYDER, THE MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION (2011); 
see also INGA KATRIN NELSON, “EACH GENERATION OF A FREE SOCIETY”: THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MONTANA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS PROTECTIONS, AND STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM (2011) (unpublished thesis, 
Portland State University), https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds. 






THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS SECTION 
 
The floor consideration of the Declaration was generally a model 
of civil and careful discussion—even when, early on, an occasional con-
troversial matter would surface.  Delegate Monroe introduced the inalien-
able rights section, stating that it only made minor changes, and urged its 
adoption.  However, that reassuring calm didn’t last long. 
Delegate Kelleher offered an amendment to the inalienable rights 
section to announce that “all persons are conceived . . . free and have cer-
tain inalienable rights . . . .”  As opposed to the original language that 
specified, they were “born free.”  Of course, that generated quite a stir on 
the floor.16 
Chairman Dahood rose quickly in opposition to the amendment, 
characterizing it as an effort to flatly prohibit abortion in the state.  He 
urged that it did not belong in the Montana Constitution and should be left 
to the legislature.17  Having taken what was, for him, an unusually concise 
position, he sat down; and you could feel the air going out of the place. 
Recall that this debate was occurring well before the controversial 
Roe v. Wade decision was handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court.  After 
Dahood made his straightforward point, the amendment failed by a wide 
margin, on a vote of 15-71.  Interestingly, a number of the Convention’s 
most progressive members were among those favoring the amendment, 
perhaps principally on religious grounds as the Catholic church had 
weighed in heavily to press for that sort of language in the document.  The 
opposition to the amendment was broad-based.18 
Of course, the debates over abortion and choice still resonate na-
tionwide these days, as the United States Senate Majority Leader has had 
U.S. Senators vote on a number of abortion-constraining measures that 
could affect tens of thousands of women who face a choice that the major-
ity of elected officials cannot, or choose not to, comprehend or respect.  
 
16.  MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT, 
Vol. V, 1636-40 (1972) [hereinafter MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
TRANSCRIPT V]. 
17.  Id. at 1640. 
18.  Id. at 1640-42 (Delegates Cate, Cross, Harrington, Roeder and 
VanBuskirk were among the amendment's supporters.  Opponents included Bowman, 
Bugbee, Dahood, Eck, Felt, Habedank, Reichert, Speer, and a broad cross-section of 
other delegates). 
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And, there are now numerous cases working their way toward the U.S. 
Supreme Court—several of which are designed to test whether the cur-
rently more conservative, more ideologically rigid, and in some ways, 
even more activist Court, will weaken or perhaps even turn away from the 
45-year-old established Roe precedent.19 
Let’s dig a bit deeper into the floor action on several of the most 
innovative provisions. 
 
THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PROVISION (BILL OF RIGHTS, SECTION 4) 
 
 [N]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the 
laws.  Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, 
or institution shall discriminate against any person in the 
exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race, 
color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political 
or religious ideas.20 
 
This provision was explicitly written and intended to prohibit discrimina-
tion by private individuals and entities as well as the public sector.  On the 
floor, Delegate Mansfield introduced it: 
 
The committee unanimously adopted this section with the 
intent of providing a constitutional impetus for the eradi-
cation of public and private discrimination based on race, 
color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political 
or religious ideas.  The provision, quite similar to that of 
the Puerto Rico declaration of rights, is aimed at prohib-
iting private as well as public discrimination in civil and 
political rights.  Considerable testimony was heard con-
cerning the need to include sex in any equal protection or 
freedom from discrimination provisions.  The committee 
felt that such inclusion was eminently proper and saw no 
reason for the state to wait for the adoption of the federal 
equal rights amendment or any amendment which would 
not explicitly provide as much protection as this provi-
sion.  The word “culture” was incorporated specifically to 
cover groups whose cultural base is distinct from main-
stream Montana, especially the American Indians.  Social 
origin or condition was included to cover discrimination 
 
19.   Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a 7–2 decision that remains at the 
center of a political firestorm to this day and perhaps will for a long time. 
20. MONT. CONST., art. II, § 4.  
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based on status of income and standard of living.  Some 
fears were expressed that the wording “political or reli-
gious ideas” would permit persons who supported the 
right to work in principle to avoid union membership.  
Such is not the intent of the committee.  The wording was 
incorporated to prohibit public and private concerns dis-
criminating against persons because of their political or 
religious beliefs . . . .  The committee is well aware that 
any broad proposal on these subjects will require consid-
erable statutory embellishment.  It is hoped that the Leg-
islature will enact statutes to promote effective eradica-
tion of the discriminations prohibited in this section.21 
 
Immediately after Mansfield’s opening remarks, Delegate 
Habedank tried directly to reduce the broader application of the provision 
solely to state and local entities—essentially to the public sphere—by 
moving to strike its prohibition against discrimination by persons, private 
firms and entities, and corporations.  He worried specifically that the Com-
mittee’s intentionally broader language might complicate the desire of an 
organization like the Sons of Norway to exclude persons who are not ac-
tually Norwegian.22 
Chairman Dahood responded that the intent of the Committee rec-
ommendation was explicitly to prohibit a variety of forms of discrimina-
tion that were then too common—in employment, home and apartment 
rentals, accommodations, commercial services, and other matters that 
were quasi-public. 
Delegate Holland expressed a concern that the Elks or Masons 
might be required to admit women, of all things, to their membership.  Da-
hood responded that common sense should handle that concern.  Later, 
Delegate Robinson/Ellingson inquired whether the language would need 
to be given full effect by legislative action to define its ultimate impact 
and perhaps even its overall boundaries.  Dahood responded that constitu-
tional provisions “are presumed to be self-executing, particularly within 
the Bill of Rights.  If the language appears to be prohibitory and manda-
tory, as this particular section is intended to be, then in that event, the 
courts in interpreting the particular section are bound by that particular 
presumption and they must assume, in that situation, that it is self-execut-
 
21.  MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT V, supra note 
16, at 1642.  
22.  Id.  
2020     MONTANA CONSTITUTION DECLARATION OF RIGHTS        115 
ing.”  Delegate Robinson/Ellingson indicated that was a satisfactory an-
swer.  Thereupon, the Habedank amendment was defeated by a wide mar-
gin, 13–76 and the provision was advanced intact.23 
 
THE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT, SOMETIMES OVERLOOKED  
INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY PROVISION (SECTION 4) 
 
The dignity of the human being is inviolable . . . .24 
 
The provision on individual dignity clearly has not received as 
much attention as I expected once it became clear that there was interest 
in incorporating it in the Committee draft.  Dignity can be a nebulous con-
cept, hard to define or pin down in much detail in a constitutional setting.  
But when you think about it, other now commonplace constitutional mat-
ters once lacked clear definitions or details that have been and still are 
being fleshed out over centuries of interpretation (e.g., the bedrock due 
process of law being just one example). 
The concept of dignity potentially opens an important window 
into a number of contemporary issues that the founders themselves would 
likely have struggled with, perhaps unsuccessfully, given the circum-
stances of their days when, for example, slavery was still very much a 
commonplace feature of the American economy; and major campaigns 
were already underway to displace Native Americans from lands desired 
and about to be overrun and claimed by European settlers. 
Of both these fundamental indignities, there was apparently very 
little discussion by the founders over 200 years ago.  More recently, his-
tory and literature have caught up on both topics.25  In addition, University 
of Montana professors Clifford and Huff have written an extensive, well-
reasoned and thorough analysis directly treating the Montana Constitu-
tion’s dignity provision.  It covers the sources of the concept of dignity in 
Western philosophy and law, as well as offering a compelling discussion 
of its potential future applications.26 
 
23.   Id. at 1645-46. 
24.  MONT. CONST., art. II, § 4. 
25.  E.g., VINE DELORIA, JR., BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE: AN 
INDIAN HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1970); see, e.g., ROXANNE DUNBAR-ORTIZ, 
AN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2014); see also, with re-
spect to African Americans, DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: 
THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR 
II (2012). 
26.  Matthew O. Clifford & Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the 
Meaning and Scope of the Montana Constitution’s “Dignity Clause” with Possible 
Applications, 61 MONT. L. REV. 301 (2000);  see also, Conor O’Mahony, There is No 
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The specific provision incorporated into the Montana Constitution 
had an antecedent that the Committee cited from the Constitution of Puerto 
Rico—ironically now a place where U.S. citizens are suffering from a lack 
of water and power and the indignity of neglect in the wake of a massive 
recent hurricane.  The language of the Montana provision was much 
clearer in that it was not confined to breaches of dignity by the public sec-
tor.  Puerto Rico’s judiciary later reached the same conclusion, but it was 
the result of a surprising reversal of view by that nation’s highest court.27 
In addition, the Clifford and Huff analysis makes clear that for 
purposes of interpretation, the dignity provision stands on its own; and its 
ultimate effect is not, and should not be, solely related to or dependent on 
discriminatory acts or violations of equal protection of the law.28 
 
THE RIGHT OF PARTICIPATION,  
AS SOMEWHAT EMASCULATED (SECTION 8) 
 
The public has the right to expect governmental agencies 
to afford such reasonable opportunity for citizen partici-
pation in the operation of the agencies prior to the final 
decision as may be provided by law.29 
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was much impassioned 
discussion about participatory democracy.  In many cases, advocates 
across the nation expressed a strong desire to put in place institutions that 
would expand more direct forms of democracy.  This was opposed to some 
extent by those who reached back to the founders, indicating that they 
clearly had a concern in their day about the runaway passions of an unfet-
tered majority.  That was of course a useful warning, but there was devel-
oping a widely held view on campuses and elsewhere that too many deci-
sions excluded the public and that there were not enough institutionalized 
 
Such Thing as a Right to Dignity, 10 INT’L. J.  CONST. L. 551, 574 (2012) (arguing, 
among other things, that constitutional provisions “should distinguish between the 
right to personal autonomy and self-determination and the underlying principle of hu-
man dignity from which it derives.  Moreover, it should be accepted that if dignity is 
an inherent characteristic of every human being which calls for that human being to 
be afforded equal treatment and respect, then there can be no such thing as a right to 
dignity.”). 
27.  Clifford & Huff, supra note 26, at 321. 
28.   Id. at 323-24. 
29.  MONT. CONST., art. II, § 8. 
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opportunities for ordinary citizens to be directly engaged in deliberations 
and actions that affected their lives in critical ways.30 
The Bill of Rights Committee took this political freedom issue se-
riously, as became clear when the convention took up the freedom of as-
sembly.  In introducing that provision, delegate Mansfield again spoke for 
the Committee:  
 
The basic right to assemble for redress of grievances by 
petition or remonstrance remains unchanged.  The word-
ing was tightened up a little and the phrase ‘protest gov-
ernmental action’ was substituted for the phrase ‘apply to 
those invested with the powers of government for redress 
of grievances by remonstrance.’  In doing so, the Com-
mittee notes the paramount position of the right and the 
invaluable function its responsible exercise plays in a 
democratic society.31 
 
That sentiment carried over to the right of participation, as Dele-
gate Foster, a member of the Committee, was a strong supporter of this 
right.  In several conversations, he had expressed to me his out-of-town 
perspective, as he put it, telling me about those who lived in an area where 
nearly everyone knew their neighbors; and who, as the light went down, 
parked their pickups at nearby country road intersections, switched on 
their headlights and turned up the radio music to dance into the night.  
More to the point, he said, folks there were comfortable in the daytime 
being engaged with their neighbors directly in public discussions and in 
decision-making.  He was for that reason very sympathetic to and focused 
on the need for greater participation in public life. 
On the floor, he was in the forefront of those who championed the 
strong, concise, and open-ended language on the right of participation that 
was included in the Committee proposal.  He stated:  
 
It is hard to imagine how the inclusion in our Constitution 
 
30.  See, e.g., SHMUEL LEDERMAN, HANNAH ARENDT AND 
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: A PEOPLE’S UTOPIA (2019); ALBERT DZUR, 
DEMOCRACY INSIDE (2018); TOM HAYDEN, INSPIRING PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 
(2012); and PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY (Dmitri Roussopoulos & C. George 
Benello, eds., 2004) (of course, there will always be a legitimate concern whether 
more direct democracy will in fact prove to be sufficiently deliberative). 
31.  MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT V, supra 
note 16, at 1647. 
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of a right to know and a right to participate could do any-
thing but improve in some measure responsiveness . . . 
and improve in some measure citizens’ confidence and 
satisfaction in government.  The government will be the 
better for it; the people will be the better because of it.  I 
resist the motion to delete . . . .32  
 
Unfortunately, while the right was not deleted, it was not to survive in its 
lean and most promising original form. 
At one point in the debate, Delegate Wilson noted that the lawyers 
were not in agreement and warned that “perhaps we’re opening up a field 
for a wide range of litigation.  If they can’t decide among themselves now, 
we’re in trouble.” Delegate Robinson/Ellingson’s response brought down 
the house: “[I]f we have to base our decisions on only those things that the 
lawyers can agree on, we’ll never adopt any of the Constitution.”33 
It is no surprise that the provision, with virtually no analog in other 
state constitutions, generated a fair bit of uncertainty and proved quite con-
troversial on the floor, resulting in extended debate, including a motion to 
strike it altogether.  Thankfully, that motion to delete in its entirety was 
turned down on a vote of 37–54.  But, as it turned out, that was not to be 
the end of the matter, and there were many sidebar conversations on and 
off the floor, and the discussions and debate continued as the Convention 
recessed for dinner until eight o’clock that night.34 
When the Convention reconvened, Chairman Graybill noted that 
“there have been a lot of pencils out over the dinner hour.”35  Indeed, there 
were.  Finally, after much wrangling and confusion, Delegate Davis 
moved to modify the right by adding the phrase “as provided by law.” No 
one really saw this one coming.  I shrank in my chair when Delegate Eck 
essentially responded that, while she was not sure, she thought all the 
rights provisions anticipated some form of legislative definition, that she 
believed “almost all of these sections inferred ‘as provided by law.’” She 
deferred to Delegate Dahood, who interposed no objection to the amend-
ment.  He expressed his belief that the Legislature or a city council might 
need to set down guidelines, but did not directly comment on Delegate 
Eck’s observation about the potential need for legislative action on many 
rights in the declaration.  The amendment was adopted by voice vote.36 
 
32.  MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT V, supra note 
16, at 1657-58. 
33.  Id. at 1661. 
34.  Id. at 1662. 
35.  Id. at 1663. 
36.  Id. at 1668. 
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The reason I found myself cringing at any suggestion that the 
rights in the declaration might generally be somehow dependent on legis-
lative action is that constitutional rights in the American tradition are typ-
ically written expressly to stand on their own and with the intention that 
legal proceedings can be employed, and will from time to time be neces-
sary, to permit judgments whether legislative and executive actions are 
consistent with a Constitutional provision—not the other way around. 
I believe, and I think the historical record demonstrates, that the 
“as may be provided by law” language has been something of an obstacle 
to fuller-scale experimentation with various forms of citizen participation 
in Montana.  Of course, there have been some important statutory provi-
sions that help enhance conventional avenues to participation, and, as 
Mike Meloy recently reminded me, the right of participation itself has 
been read in ways that have significantly bolstered the companion right to 
know in various legal proceedings around the state.  In particular, the ab-
sence of notice or an agenda can render attendance at a meeting useless.  
As the delegates knew when they considered the right to participation, it 
was intentionally drafted as a companion to the right to know, and it is 
reassuring to see that they are being read in a complementary fashion. 
My overall point about the right is somewhat different.  It is that 
we have not tested the benefits, for example, of such things as sanctioned 
town hall-style sessions or experiments with ad hoc citizen councils to try 
to make progress on difficult issues at state or local levels.  These kinds of 
participatory institutions should be initiated and evaluated as a means to 
foster collaborative deliberations on some of the more contentious issues 
confronting state and local governments and their affected publics.37 
I remain hopeful that, in the long run, this particular Convention 
debate and the adopted language are not necessarily dispositive on the 
question of whether the courts may ultimately have some more decisive 
role in helping to further define, or at least prod refinements and embel-
lishments of, the right.   
At the risk of oversimplification, I suspect that, under the right 
factual circumstances, the courts could hold that the reasonable expecta-
tions of citizens may not be fully realized or given effect by whatever stat-
utes a state legislature may find itself able to adopt as a means of deter-
mining the fully-settled bounds of effective approaches to enhanced 
citizen participation. 
Stepping back for a moment, what is certainly more generally and 
fundamentally important in my view, is that the civil liberties and political 
 
37.  Cf. LEDERMAN and DZUR, supra note 30. 
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freedoms expressed in constitutions—federal and state—should not be un-
duly circumscribed or otherwise weakened or undermined by statute.  Leg-
islative and administrative actions can and should be challenged in an ap-
propriate way whenever they seek to make, or do in fact accomplish, 
unreasonable or unwise constrictions on even a provision like the right of 
participation that may not be seen as fully self-executing. 
As always, time will tell; and to date, I admit that recent history 
has not been overly friendly to a robustly expanded right of participation 
along the lines I had hoped for.  Most opportunities for participation center 
on the more commonplace public notice and public hearings with testi-
mony.  These are not typically deliberative sessions that involve public 
participants in deliberations. 
Down the road, in areas urban or rural, there may be a resurgence 
of interest in and respect for citizenship that will lead to more careful ex-
periments in citizen participation in the U.S.—particularly given the dys-
functional, deeply divided, and battered condition of our public discourse.  
For now, the right is likely to remain an important component of greater 
access to decision-making. 
 
THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND ITS UNEASY BEDFELLOW,  
THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY (SECTIONS 9 AND 10) 
 
No person shall be deprived of the right to examine doc-
uments or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies 
or agencies of state government and its subdivisions, ex-
cept in cases in which the demand of individual privacy 
clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure.38 
 
The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-be-
ing of a free society and shall not be infringed without the 
showing of a compelling state interest.39 
 
The right to know appears to be more generally embraced and 
praised these days; but during the convention, it was a matter of sustained 
disgruntlement, extended disagreement and tense debate. 
The original Bill of Rights proposal from the Committee stipu-
lated that disclosure was required “except in cases in which the demand of 
individual privacy exceeds the merits of public disclosure.” A key turning 
point in the deliberations occurred when the right was revised offline so 
 
38.  MONT. CONST., art. II, § 9. 
39.  Id. § 10. 
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that the demand of individual privacy had to “clearly” exceed the merits 
of public disclosure.  Chairman Graybill reminded Clerk Smith to include 
that term in the initial reading of the provision on the floor.  That made it 
more acceptable to many, but not to all advocates of full disclosure.40 
Delegate Eck led the charge on the floor, noting the proposal was 
a companion to the right of participation.  But, even with the change in 
language elevating the right to know, Delegate Cate remained strongly op-
posed to the provision.  He urged that the provision granted a right to 
know, but then took it away with the right of privacy; and that it might 
even jeopardize the existing state statutes on openness.  He had been joined 
in that view for weeks by staunch and insistent media opposition driven 
principally by understandable fears that the individual privacy language 
might be used by agencies to fatally undermine the public’s right to know.  
It was clear at the time that the press might even oppose the ratification of 
the Constitution over this issue. 
Delegate Cate moved to modify the individual privacy language, 
limiting it to instances in which the legislature determined that the “de-
mand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclo-
sure”—leaving the admittedly thorny interplay of these two rights up to 
the vagaries of each new session of the state legislature.  Delegate Foster 
was aware that Dan Foley, a respected journalist of the day, had in fact 
endorsed the balancing of the right to know against the right of privacy in 
the way the Committee had originally proposed and quoted him to that 
effect on the floor. 
Floor discussion ensued in the long shadow of the pointed edito-
rials calling for the outright elimination of the entire right to know.  For-
tunately, a motion to delete the language was handily defeated on a vote 
of 14–76.  Delegate Foster then strongly opposed the Cate Amendment by 
noting the Committee had specifically considered whether to leave the bal-
ance to the legislature and, expressing confidence in the judgment of the 
courts, had concluded it was not appropriate to leave it to the legislature. 
The Cate amendment to circumscribe the right of privacy also 
went down on a vote of 30–56.  But the debate was not over.  At one point, 
Chairman Graybill declined to restate what he termed the “lingo” of a pre-
vious discussion.  At the end, in an exchange between Delegate Heliker 
and Chairman Dahood, Heliker pressed for clarity on the question whether 
a corporation could be an individual.  The Chairman clarified that the right 
of individual privacy was precisely that: a right of individuals, and there-
fore not claimable by corporations.41 
 
40.  MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT V, supra note 
16, at 1669.  
41.  Id. at 1669-80. 
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At the beginning of the floor discussion of the right of privacy 
provision, itself the subject of comparatively little floor debate, Delegate 
Campbell made the point even more emphatically by adding the term “in-
dividual” to the provision.  He indicated that this would clearly exclude 
agencies or corporations (as the latter may, in some circumstances be con-
sidered as persons) from claiming that the individual privacy protections 
apply to them.  At that point, Delegate Harper, with the support of Chair-
man Dahood, successfully moved to strike the compelling state interest 
language from the proposal, but it was to be re-inserted later. 
Subsequent to the Convention, the right to know and the right of 
individual privacy have attracted, and arguably necessitated a healthy rash 
of litigation.  This should have surprised no one.  There was a clear inabil-
ity of state and local institutions to absorb them and to quickly and cor-
rectly implement the new openness requirement.  Many no doubt earnestly 
believed that their documents and deliberations would result in better out-
comes if they did not have to reveal everything to a sometimes-trouble-
some public.  But some simply tried to circumvent or even ignore the lan-
guage and the openness it required.  Nonetheless, the provision was quite 
clear at the constitutional level of generality that the public had the right 
to know and could sue to enforce it; and, in many instances the right to 
know was honored, with or without resort to litigation.42 
Eventually, the legislature recognized and eased some of the ob-
vious financial burden on citizens, and even media companies, who when 
pressing for disclosure were often forced to retain and pay for legal assis-
tance, without a realistic hope of recovering their costs. 
 
THE INALIENABLE RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHFUL ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
42.  The most commonly anticipated balancing in right to know cases is 
with the right of individual privacy.  See, e.g., In re Petition of Missoula County v. 
Bitterroot Star, 345 P.3d 1035 (Mont. 2015).  However, another interesting conflict 
that can arise is between the right to know and the right to a fair trial.  State ex rel. 
Smith v. District Court, 654 P.2d 982 (Mont. 1982).  The more visible Krakauer case 
also raised and settled the question whether an out-of-state journalist has standing to 
compel the university to release disciplinary records.  The answer is he does.  Krakauer 
v. State by and through Christian, 381 P.3d 524 (Mont. 2016).  The Court has also 
held that open meeting statutes are to be liberally construed in Assoc. Press v. Crofts, 
89 P.3d 971 (Mont. 2004), and it has declared the litigation exception that had been 
used in the past to allow public entities to close meetings for discussions of litigation 
strategy unconstitutional.  The holding is—for now—limited to discussions of litiga-
tion between public entities.  Assoc. Press v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. 804 P.2d 376 (Mont. 
1991). 
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All persons are born free and have certain inalienable 
rights.  They include the right to a clean and healthful en-
vironment . . . .43 
 
As mentioned previously, I conducted the pre-Convention re-
search on the environmental provisions.44  However, these were taken up 
principally by the Convention’s Natural Resource and Agriculture Com-
mittee, which had jurisdiction.  That Committee was chaired by a persis-
tent dynamo, Louise Cross.  I did not staff that committee, but I was made 
available to them to explain my research in their area.  And Chairman Da-
hood on behalf of the Bill of Rights Committee had asked in a letter to be 
kept fully informed of their work.  That helped open lines of communica-
tion between the two committees and, as it happened, that had a profound 
impact on the deliberations of both committees and on the provisions ulti-
mately adopted in the Constitution.  What is clear is that Bill of Rights 
Committee members maintained a concerned and watchful eye on the Nat-
ural Resource Committee’s deliberations then proceeding down the hall. 
Without going into a lot of detail, given the work of other authors 
in this collection, I’ll just note that while there was plenty of floor debate 
on environmental provisions, there were also many discussions about them 
on and off the Convention floor.  As Delegate Robinson/Ellingson indi-
cated in her session with Evan Barrett in his compelling televised Crucible 
of Change series, “a great many of us . . . did not believe (the Natural 
Resource Committee’s proposal) was the strongest because we did have at 
our disposal several other state constitutions that had recently dealt with 
the environment—Puerto Rico and Illinois and actually even North Da-
kota, all had adopted environmental provisions in their Constitu-
tion . . . .”45  She, Bob Campbell, and other delegates resolved to improve 
on the Natural Resources Committee’s proposal, if they could. 
On the floor, delegate George James, a Bill of Rights Committee 
member and the postmaster from my hometown of Libby, took the first 
run at it.  He urged early on that the environment provision should explic-
itly include the phrase “clean and healthful” to modify the term environ-
ment.  In that, he was unsuccessful, and disappointed.46  But, after consid-
erable further discussions and jockeying, that qualifying language was 
 
43.  MONT. CONST., art. II, § 3. 
44.  APPLEGATE, supra note 2, at 249. 
45.  In the Crucible of Change: For Future Generations: Preamble and 
Environmental Provisions of 1972 Montana Constitution (Montana Tech video series 
broadcast May 15, 2015). 
46.  MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT V, supra note 
16, at 1202.  
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surprisingly adopted.47 And, later in the Convention deliberations, it was 
even added to the inalienable rights section of the Declaration of Rights—
in what turned out to be a step of substantial legal importance.48 
One of the most intriguing floor debates on the environmental pro-
visions occurred when the Convention considered Delegate Cate’s pro-
posal to incorporate the Public Trust Doctrine in the Montana Constitu-
tion—an old doctrine that I had researched in my study.  It turned out that 
the doctrine was too much and, although it had been around in various 
forms in the common law for over a century, it was too uncertain and wor-
risome for the delegates to find it would be useful or acceptable to include 
in the proposed Constitution.49 
After considerable discussion, including an accusation that the 
provision was socialistic, and with some expressing fears about its adverse 
effects on private property and the broader economy, the Cate amendment 
was defeated 34–58.  A subsequent amendment by Delegate Robinson/El-
lingson providing an explicit citizen right to sue on environmental matters 
was also more narrowly defeated 43–51.50 
As noted by Meloy in this collection, it was on the floor that Del-
egate Burkhardt subsequently offered, during the debate on the Declara-
tion of Rights, his amendment to include the right to a clean and healthful 
environment as an inalienable right in that declaration.  After a brief dis-
cussion with Chairman Dahood about whether he was trying to further ex-
pand citizen standing to sue, on which Delegate Burkhardt was studiously 
a bit vague, the amendment was adopted.  My view at the time was that 
the law of standing, of access to the courts was evolving rather rapidly and 
 
47.  Id. at 1250. 
48.  Id. at 1637-40.  On the floor, Delegate Burkhardt said, “it seems to 
me that we are providing here [. . .] a clear intent.  It does present the right of every 
person.  And we’ve already talked about the duties of persons, and it’s nice to balance 
it with this right,” whereupon the amendment was adopted 79–7. 
49.  The initial public trust language proposed by Delegate Cate was: 
“The State of Montana shall maintain and enhance a clean and healthful environment 
as a public trust.  The sole beneficiary of the trust shall be the citizens of Montana, 
who shall have the duty to maintain and enhance the trust, and the right to protect and 
enforce it by appropriate legal proceedings against the trustee.” The floor debate on 
the Cate public trust amendment commenced at MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT V, supra note 16, at 1211. 
50.  For the vote on the Cate public trust amendment, see MONTANA 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT V, supra note 16, at 1227-28; and for the 
vote on the subsequent Robinson/Ellingson citizen suit proposal, taken after a lengthy 
floor debate, see MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT V, supra note 
16, at 1240-41. 
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the language would in the long run provide citizens under the right cir-
cumstances an enhanced opportunity to pursue the right to a clean and 
healthful environment in the courts.51 
Meloy discusses this issue in his excellent overview of the Con-
vention’s environmental provisions, so I will leave it largely alone.  Save 
to say he notes the seminal state Supreme Court holding that citizens in-
deed have standing to challenge environmentally degrading activity—spe-
cifically, mine water discharges to the Blackfoot River.  The plaintiffs met 
the test and were able to litigate the right because they appropriately 
claimed fishing and other recreational interests and activities were at issue. 
And there was a further promising development when the Court 
clearly stated the need to apply a “strict scrutiny” standard to actions that 
arguably violate the constitutional right.  This makes it clear that the courts 
can delve deeply into the facts of a particular case where allegations are 
being made that the right is being violated.52 
 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONVENTION  
AND SOME RECENT AMENDMENTS 
 
While the deliberations and adoption of the Montana Declaration 
of Rights were not without controversy at the time, the document now ap-
pears pretty much embedded in Montana case law and practice and is 
largely agreeable if not always expansively implemented.  Barring some 
renewed effort to re-open the Constitution, the meaning will continue to 
be refined by the courts and, to some extent by the state legislatures and 
administrative practice in the years ahead. 
 
51. There are numerous articles on environmental provisions in state con-
stitutions.  See, e.g., Jack R. Tuholske, U.S. State Constitutions and Environmental 
Protection: Diamonds in the Rough, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 239 (2015);  ART ENGLISH 
& JOHN J. CARROLL, STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL BILLS OF RIGHTS, 
BOOK OF THE STATES (2015); C. B. McNeil, A Clean and Healthful Environment and 
Original Intent, 22 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 83 (2001).  Deborah Beaumont 
Schmidt & Robert J. Thompson, The Montana Constitution and the Right to a Clean 
and Healthful Environment, 51 MONT. L. REV. 411 (1990).  
52. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 
1246 (Mont. 1999), holding that because the provision was a fundamental right in the 
Declaration of Rights, “any statute or rule which implicates that right must be strictly 
scrutinized and can only survive scrutiny if the State establishes a compelling state 
interest and that its action is closely tailored to effectuate that interest and is the least 
onerous path that can be taken to achieve the State’s objective.” The law of standing 
has continued to evolve, but the withdrawn opinion of Justice Haswell remains an 
intriguing issue for future students of the state constitution’s ability to advance ac-
countability for environmental harm and damage.  See infra Goetz, note 67, at 347. 
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There have of course been several significant amendments to the 
Declaration of Rights since its initial adoption as part of the ratified Con-
stitution; among them the provision abolishing sovereign immunity gen-
erated a lot of concern and was amended to permit the state legislature to 
make exceptions by a supermajority vote.53 Same sex marriage was pro-
hibited by amendment in 2004, but that amendment is essentially inoper-
able given the United States Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling that legalized 
same sex marriage in all 50 states.54 
In 2016, a lengthy provision was added as Section 36 of the Bill 
of Rights covering the subject of victims’ rights, including over a dozen 
specific protections: due process; freedom from any form of harassment; 
protection for the victim; and the victim’s location; counsel; notification 
of release or escape by the accused; full and timely restitution; and more. 
 
A SELECTION OF INTERESTING AND JUST PLAIN CURIOS HOLDINGS  
ON THE CONSTITUTION’S DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
 
Above, I have pointed to what I hope are some of the most signif-
icant developments in and implications for the more innovative provisions 
in the State Constitution up through roughly the end of last year.  Not sur-
prisingly, Montana courts have issued a number of other rulings over the 
years on the Constitution’s provisions, generally giving them force and 
fuller meaning.  Abstracts of the cases are compiled in 1,300 pages of case-
related text in the most recent volume of the Montana Code Annotated that 
specifically deal with the Montana Constitution.  Of these, over two-
thirds—some 950 of those pages—are lawsuits involving the Declaration 
of Rights.  The remaining 350 or so pages cover cases relevant to the leg-
islative and executive functions of the government; revenue and finance; 
environment and natural resources (which as noted came to have a clear 
connection to the Declaration of Rights), local government and so on. 
I point to a few of the more interesting and even curious cases 
below.  I’ll admit that a large part of me is glad I do not have more time to 
be more systematic in digging through this mass of case law and interpre-
tation, as life and family are awaiting the completion of this essay. 
 
53.  APPLEGATE,  supra note 2, at 289.  See also Barry L. Hjort, The Pass-
ing of Sovereign Immunity in Montana: The King is Dead! 34 MONT. L. REV. 283 
(1973).  But see John A. Kutzman, The King’s Resurrection: Sovereign Immunity Re-
turns to Montana, 51 MONT. L. REV. 529 (1990); and James E. Conwell, Limitations 
on Legislative Immunity: A New Era for Montana’s Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 54 
MONT. L. REV. 127 (1993). 
54.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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The Court has held that the opportunity to pursue employment is 
a fundamental right.  One might not think that would become an issue, but 
it did.55  
Unfortunately for those not sufficiently studious in class, the 
Court has found that extracurricular school activities are not a matter of 
fundamental rights, and as a result, a 2.0 GPA requirement to qualify for 
sports is constitutionally permissible.56 
It is unconstitutional to restrict welfare benefits based on an age 
restriction applied to those under age 50; and the State is not deemed to be 
in so financially unsound a position that it might be permitted to abrogate 
those benefits.57 Therefore, a state agency “no whining” rule seems to ap-
ply here. 
Conversely, the “right to welfare” is not a fundamental constitu-
tional right, citing language that I recognize all too well in the Bill of 
Rights Committee report which provides: “the intent . . . is not to create a 
substantive right for all the necessities of life to be provided by the public 
treasury.”58  Also, the Court examined Article XII, Section 3(3) of the 
Montana Constitution, which requires in seemingly straightforward lan-
guage, that the legislature “shall provide such economic assistance and so-
cial and rehabilitative service as may be necessary for those inhabitants 
who, by reason of age, infirmities or misfortune may have need for aid of 
society.”59  The Court held that, since the provision was not placed in the 
Declaration of Rights, it could not be a fundamental right.  Apparently, 
location matters.  One is left to conclude that a right may not be a funda-
mental right unless it is found in the right place, in Article II of the Mon-
tana Constitution. 
The Court has also held that preparation of an Environmental Im-
pact Statement pursuant to the Montana Environmental Policy Act is not 
required by the Constitution’s right to a clean and healthful environment 
provision.60 
As mentioned above, the Court has reflected Convention intent by 
holding that the right of individual privacy is just that.  It applies to human 
 
55.  Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1173 (Mont. 1996). 
56.  State ex rel. Bartmess v. Bd. of Tr. of Sch. Dist. No. 1, 726 P.2d 801 
(Mont. 1986). 
57.  Butte Cmty. Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Mont. 1986). 
58.  Id. 
59.  Id. at 1310; see also Scott C. Wurster, Butte Community Credit Union 
v. Lewis: A New Constitutional Standard for Evaluating General Assistance Legisla-
tion, 48 MONT. L. REV. 163, 176 (1987), in which it is concluded that the state legis-
lation at issue “is merely an unconstitutional device to conserve state funds.” 
60.  Kadillak v. Anaconda Co., 602 P.2d 147 (Mont. 1979). 
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beings, and not to corporations—those ubiquitous legal fictions that now 
dominate our national and international economic and political lives, 
though created principally for what seemed a rational purpose, to promote 
entrepreneurship and to assist investors by providing, among other things, 
liability limitations.61 
Under the state Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, a physician is not 
liable for assisting in giving effect to the wishes of a patient.62 
In a free speech case, the Court concluded that free speech does 
not include the right to cause “substantial emotional distress by harassment 
or intimidation.”63 
But the Court has also occasionally found itself well out in the 
frontier of the English language, as in an ear-popping free speech decision, 
where the Court held that the freedom of speech clause does not protect an 
unprovoked obscenity directed at a police officer (in this case, calling the 
officer a fornicating porcine).  Not your typical language encountered in a 
law school class.64 
In what seems an odd holding on openness in government, the 
Court has found an agency can reduce its legal jeopardy for what amounts 
to an illegally closed session by simply holding a subsequent open session.  
One may be forgiven for wondering how that ruling gives the requisite 
constitutionally-guaranteed access to deliberations and documents.65 
These are just a selected few of the many cases as, by my estimate, 
the annotated discussions of the Declaration of Rights would require an 
 
61.  Great Falls Tribune v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 82 P.3d 876 (Mont. 
2003) (holding that the right of individual privacy exception to the right to know is 
limited to “natural human individuals and does not apply to nonhuman entities such 
as corporations.”  The Court also held that the right to know does not require disclo-
sure of trade secrets or other proprietary information “when that data is protected from 
disclosure elsewhere in the state or federal constitution or by statute.”) See also State 
ex rel. Smith v. District Court, 201 Mont. 376 (1982) (recognizing that the right to 
know may collide with the right of a defendant to a fair trial).  
62.  Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1219 (Mont. 2009); see also  The 
Rights of Terminally Ill Act, Mont. Code Ann. § 50-9-101 (2019), which provides that 
terminally ill patients are entitled to autonomous end-of-life decisions even if a phy-
sician is involved in withholding treatment; and the physician will not be held crimi-
nally liable for honoring the patient’s wishes.  The lower court had held that the patient 
had a right to die with dignity founded on the constitutional rights to individual dignity 
and privacy; but the Supreme Court declined to rule on the constitutional issue, relying 
instead solely on statute.  
63.  See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction 
of Emotional Distress Tort, 2010 CARDOZO  L. REV. DE NOVO 300. 
64.  State v. Robinson, 82 P.3d 27, 31 (Mont. 2003). 
65.  Zunski v. Frenchtown Rural Fire Dep’t Bd. of Trs., 309 P.3d 21, 26 
(Mont. 2013). 
2020     MONTANA CONSTITUTION DECLARATION OF RIGHTS        129 
entire year or two of law review space, perhaps even more, just to scratch 




When you step away from the State Constitution and all that went 
into it, it is a fair question to ask how much the compelling words on paper 
in the Declaration of Rights, the subsequent legislative and administrative 
embellishments, and the mass of judicial rulings have really changed 
things on the ground—particularly as we watch legislative and electoral 
battles that remind us of the much less inspiring history of the state. 
In Helena on a recent trip last year, I sat with pages of newsprint, 
the kind that leaves ink stains on your hands, pages from the Helena Inde-
pendent Record—which I know some have occasionally referred to as the 
“Independent Wretched” (an unjustified if tame tag these days, given what 
we hear about the press in these too frequently unhinged times).  As was 
frequently the case, I enjoyed the Record as, on that day, it covered yet 
another improperly noticed legislative meeting—what I would have 
thought would be largely a thing of the past by now.  The paper reported 
that an objectionable session closed to the public was recently cast by state 
legislative leadership as somehow a “working session,” even though a full 
committee quorum was present in the room, and Legislative Council had 
said that, legally, it should have been publicly announced.  I read the clear 
reaction of Mike Meloy, for decades the most prominent legal watchdog 
for open government in the state, urging that the practice not be repeated.66 
In those same pages, it was reported that the proposed Medicaid 
extension legislation was still in limbo in the legislature, hobbling along, 
with an intriguing if, in my view, misdirected debate about adding work 
requirements that could in various versions of the bill take away the right 
to coverage for a few thousand or perhaps even tens of thousands of Mon-
tanans.  Any one of those citizens, no longer protected, could turn out to 
be a family member or a close friend or acquaintance who, through no 
fault of their own might be left with their wellness and their ability to pur-
sue life’s basic necessities essentially out of reach. 
In addition, some new legislation, commonly known as Hanna’s 
Act, had been introduced with considerable fanfare as a direct way to ad-
dress what was termed an epidemic of murdered and missing Native 
 
66. Holly Michels, Groups Complain Legislative Meetings Held With-
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women.67  The Montana legislation appeared at the time to be proceeding 
marginally well and was later signed into law.68  It was spurred by 14-year-
old freshman Henny Scott, who was found dead on the Northern Cheyenne 
Reservation in the winter of 2013. 
A recent nationwide study has revealed that on or near some res-
ervations, Native and indigenous women are ten times more likely to be 
murdered than their non-Native counterparts.  Their deaths, ghastly by any 
standard, amount to a wrenching violation of the most fundamental of 
rights, the right to life.69 
Up North, Canada is struggling to address this historical problem 
with, among other things, a broadly-based Reconciliation Commission, 
while the United States is lagging.  It is hoped that the recent steps taken 
in Montana, with this law and related missing persons legislation, com-
bined with essential funding, will spur action to reduce the frequency of 
these crimes dramatically and soon.70 
On another issue in the legislature, it appeared that the minimum 
standards for private residential programs for troubled teens—under the 
age of majority—might become a thing of the past after a key legislator 
held a private session with unnamed owners of a number of the private 
facilities who apparently had an interest in shedding the prescriptions.  Af-
ter the meeting, the legislator came up with some new amendments that 
appeared to allow for reduced quality of care, changing the content of the 
bill from when it was originally introduced for consideration.71 
The beleaguered Colstrip plants seemed never to be far from the 
headlines.  They continue to bring up over and over the question of how 
much coal we should have been and should now be pulling from the 
ground—and for how much longer, given the increasing recognition that 
urgent action is needed to reduce carbon emissions.  One wonders if there 
will ever be a connection between Colstrip and the right to a clean and 
 
67. See An Act Establishing  “Hanna’s Act”, H.R. 21, 66th Leg. (Mont. 
2019).  
68. Mont. Code Ann. § 44-2-407 (2019).   
69.  Indian Law Resource Center, Ending Violence Against Native 
Women, https://indianlaw.org/issue/ending-violence-against-native-women. 
70.  The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, FINAL REPORT 
OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF CANADA (2015), 
http://nctr.ca/assets/reports/Final%20Reports/Executive_Summary_Eng-
lish_Web.pdf. 
71.  Seaborn Larson, Troubled Youth Programs Have Long Steered State 
Policy in Montana, HELENA INDEP. REC., May 4, 2019, http://helenair.com. 
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healthful environment provision.  At some point, the full tab for the im-
pacts of fossil fuel development will come due and it seems unlikely the 
past and current owners of the plants will be in a position to foot the bill.72 
And just a while ago, the Record carried a related story about leg-
islation that dealt further with the shutdown of the Colstrip coal plants and 
other operations.  While the bill was apparently focused principally on the 
Colstrip plants, where settlements have already been reached for closure 
of two of the generators, the old issue of WR Grace and the tremolite as-
bestos tragedy re-surfaced.  The cost of that federal Superfund cleanup in 
Libby Montana is now estimated at over $500 million; and the asbestos 
produced there and elsewhere has historically been shipped and used in 
construction all over the country, even around the world.  When the World 
Trade Center towers came down on September 11, the dust from the col-
lapse was littered with tremolite asbestos.  Hundreds of people have suc-
cumbed to asbestosis and related diseases in Libby and the Kootenai Val-
ley, the result of living in that beautiful but ultimately unclean and 
unhealthy environment.73 
While these and more may cast some doubt on the benefits of the 
state’s constitutional provisions, I believe Professors Clifford and Huff put 
it best in their previously cited article on the dignity provision: 
 
Montanans are extraordinarily lucky to have a constitu-
tion with a Declaration of Rights which so clearly and 
forcefully articulates the grand ideals of constitutional de-
mocracy, such as dignity, privacy, and the right to know.  
 
72.  Coal companies are not demonstrating an ability to handle the debts 
they have accumulated and the external costs they have imposed.  See Daniel Moritz-
Rabson, Eleven Coal Companies Have Filed for Bankruptcy Since Trump Took Office, 
NEWSWEEK, https://www.newsweek.com/eight-coal-companies-have-filed-bank-
ruptcy-since-trump-took-office-1468734, Oct. 30, 2019.  Even with rollback in envi-
ronmental rules governing fossil fuels, the number appears certain to grow in the 
months and years ahead.  The so-called war on coal is being won by the superior eco-
nomics of natural gas and the competitive pressures of increasingly affordable renew-
ables, in some cases coupled with improving battery storage technologies. 
73.  Tim Povtak, EPA Leaving Libby Asbestos Superfund Site to Montana, 
Asbestos Exposure & Bans, http://www.asbestos.com/news/2019/11/11/asbestos-
cleanup-libby-ending/.  See also, Andrew Schneider & David McCumber, An Air That 
Still Kills (2016).  More than 400 people in the Libby area have died from various 
asbestos-related disease and it is expected that there will continue to be victims in the 
years ahead.  Once, while at a reception in Utah, I met a woman who, in the course of 
conversation indicated she was working to halt the frivolous anti-asbestos lawsuits 
flooding the country.  I calmly informed her that I was born and raised in Libby and 
she turned a whiter shade of pale.  True story. 
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The burden of “making good” on the promise of this con-
stitution now falls to attorneys . . . to raise the appropriate 
issues, and ultimately to the Montana Supreme Court to 
elaborate and institutionalize these quite glorious rights.74 
 
And James Goetz captured it well when he wrote: “If we continue 
to have a judiciary with integrity, if we insist on principled decisions, and, 
most important, if we maintain fidelity to the spirit of the framers who 
came together in 1972 to give us this system, the charter should stand us 
in good stead for many years.”75  As it should. 
 
SOME REFLECTIONS ON CURRENTLY RELEVANT  
RIGHTS ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
 
Sometimes, when I turn from the fondly remembered experiences 
of the Montana Constitutional Convention, I find myself wondering what 
I might be exploring, researching, and writing about if I were once again 
seated in Katherine Orchard's law library—under deadline, on a short 
leash, and with that same requirement to look at the state of civil liberties 
and political freedoms, but this time for 2020 and beyond. 
As I have thought about that, it has become clear to me that the 
list these days is a much longer one—not shortened even by the committed 
and excellent work of the delegates assembled in Helena 50 years ago. 
So, as this set of historical reflections winds down for me, let’s 
take a brief tour of a few of the issues that have arisen or re-emerged—all 
of which have relevance as they implicate important civil liberties or po-
litical freedoms, and some of which may be good candidates for further 
“little laboratory” experimentation in state constitutions. 
The list below obviously reflects only my perspective, but here are 
a few to consider.  First, a number of civil liberties issues. 
 
THE RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHFUL ENVIRONMENT  
IN A WARMING WORLD 
 
We revisit this one as the first and perhaps the most critical—even 
though, of course, Montana already has its own provisions on the environ-
ment, discussed previously and in other essays in this collection.  Numer-
ous other states have also addressed the environment, and several jurisdic-
tions are being pressed to add similar language to their state constitutions.  
 
74.  Clifford & Huff, supra note 26 at 336. 
75.  James H. Goetz, Interpretations of the Montana Constitution: Some-
times Socratic, Sometimes Erratic, 51 MONT. L. REV. 355 (1990). 
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Recently, for example, an article in the Bay Journal reported that citizens 
in Maryland are discussing the prospect of adding an environmental pro-
vision of some kind.76  And there are stirrings in other states. 
Illinois had environmental provisions in its 1970 Constitution; and 
Pennsylvania adopted its own in 1971; then Montana in 1972; and other 
states have since followed suit, including, as of 2015, Massachusetts, Ha-
waii, and Rhode Island.  Some of these provisions have explicit language 
allowing citizen enforcement of the environmental right (e.g., Illinois).  
Some even include a version of the public trust applicable to certain re-
sources—as does Montana, for state lands and, arguably to a certain extent 
for water resources (though over-appropriation and even complete de-
watering of streams still occur in the state).77 
What remains hard to discern is the effect of these constitutional 
provisions on the overall quality of the environment in the states that have 
adopted them.  But perhaps what is most glaring of all is the failure to 
update them or interpret them, so they directly connect environmental 
quality with the alarming acceleration of global warming.  For the sake of 
generations not yet born, it is imperative to undertake initiatives along the 
lines some states and local governments are aggressively pursuing as the 
federal government remains largely paralyzed if not actively resisting ef-
fective action.  In addition to the statutory and regulatory activities cur-
rently underway at other levels of government, and funding and related 
private initiatives, there may be a way to provide further impetus for pro-
gress by adopting more detailed state constitutional provisions.78 
 
76.  See Tamara Toles O’Laughlin, Go Big: Constitutional Amendment 
Needed for Climate Change, 29 BAY JOURNAL 32 (2019). 
77.  There are numerous articles available on the public trust doctrine.  See 
Gregory S. Munro, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Montana Constitution as Legal 
Bases for Climate Change Litigation in Montana, 73 MONT. L. REV. 123 (2012), 
where an argument is made that, given Montana's decision to impose the doctrine on 
navigable waters, there is no reason not to extend it to atmosphere and the airwaves; 
see also Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, The Evolution of the Public Trust Doctrine and 
the Degradation of Trust Resources: Courts, Trustees and Political Power in Wiscon-
sin, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 135, 212 (2000), which is focused primarily on water issues in 
Wisconsin.  (noting that “regardless of the natural or constitutional law supporting the 
public trust doctrine, those who administer the trust are not insulated from political 
pressure . . . .  Impairment of public trust resources is felt by anyone in Wisconsin who 
fishes, swims, or boats on the navigable waters of the state, regardless of status as 
owner or non-owner of riparian lands.”)  I would think this logic could extend to a 
broad range of resources if we were to better balance the needs of a clean and healthful 
environment against the pressures of development and potential degradation. 
78.  ART ENGLISH & JOHN J. CARROLL, State Constitutions and Environ-
mental Bill of Rights, in The Book of the States, 18 (2015).  See also Tuholske, supra 
note 51; and generally, the University of Montana symposium on the subject at 51 
134             PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW  Vol. 43 
 
 
THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF EQUAL RIGHTS  
AND THE UNEQUAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STATUS OF WOMEN 
 
The United States Constitution remains incomplete on gender 
equality, although there are promising stirrings with Virginia’s recent ap-
proval of the federal Equal Rights Amendment—by that action becoming 
the 38th state to ratify, and thereby raising some interesting legal and po-
litical questions about whether the amendment can now be pasted into the 
United States Constitution.79 
Of course, the Montana Constitution already contains equal rights  
and non-discrimination provisions, both of which squarely address gender 
inequality and discrimination.  As we know, the Montana Constitution has 
had those provisions in place, going on five decades now. 
But, here’s the rub.  Unfortunately, that language has not resulted 
in major advances toward equality, pay equity or systemic changes in the 
way we structure our economy to recognize once and for all the clear, but 
largely uncounted economic benefits of women at work—whether in the 
workplace, or working at home on the job, taking care of important family 
business, or more likely some combination of these.80 
 
Mont. L. Rev. (1990).  On the broader issue of products and activities that are harmful 
to humans and the environment, see NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, Merchants 
of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth  on Issues from Tobacco 
Smoke to  Global Warming (2010). 
79.  Gregory S. Schneider & Laura Vozzella, Virginia Finalizes Passage 
of Equal Rights Amendment, Setting Stage for Legal Fight, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2020, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-expected-to-final-
ize-passage-of-era-monday-setting-stage-for-legal-fight/2020/01/27/b178265c-4121-
11ea-b503-2b077c436617_story.html.  Recent adopting states are now suing to have 
the amendment added to the United States Constitution.  See Debra Cassens Weiss, 
Last 3 States to Ratify Equal Rights Amendment Sue to Add it to Constitution, 2020 
ABA J., https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/last-3-states-to-ratify-equal-rights-
amendment-sue-to-add-it-to-constitution. 
80.  There are many ways to value the currently unpaid efforts of similarly 
situated men and especially women toiling in the economy and in various family units.  
See UN Women, Facts and Figures: Economic Empowerment, https://www.un-
women.org/en/what-we-do/economic-empowerment/facts-and-figures; Jillian Ber-
man, Women's Unpaid Work is the Backbone of the American Economy, 
MARKETWATCH,  https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-is-how-much-more-un-
paid-work-women-do-than-men-2017-03-07 (Apr. 15, 2018); Kristalina Georgieva, et 
al., The Economic Cost of Devaluing ‘Women's Work,’ IMF 
BLOG, https://blogs.imf.org/2019/10/15/the-economic-cost-of-devaluing-womens-
work/; and see also Alisha Haridasani Gupta, Women, Burdened with Unpaid Labor, 
Bear Brunt of Global Inequality, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2020, https://www.ny-
times.com/2020/01/23/us/unpaid-work-economy-davos.html.   
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As a result, women, especially minority women, but also women 
of all ages and races, are still paid far less than men for similar work; thus, 
they remain in many instances relegated to second class status in our 
mixed economy, and they continue to face hard-to-surmount obstacles 
when they attempt to participate more fully in the public realm. I have 
even occasionally joked to friends of mine that the best way to address all 
of this is to provide that men could perhaps be denied the right to vote for 
roughly the same amount of time that women faced that prohibition—and 
then we could just see how that works out. Who knows, in that case, we 
might end up living in a much better world.  Of course, some might point—
rightly—to the increasing number of women recently elected at all levels 
of government.  It remains an unnecessarily uphill struggle for them, re-
flecting, among other things, the financial and other obstacles they face.81  
Many of the recent campaigns where women are trying to break 
through are not as well-reported, and therefore, are not as well-known as 
they might be.  Nonetheless, we can easily see the impact that those who 
win office are having at the national level on a host of issues.  Even so, we 
have to be struck by the unwillingness of Congress to bolster the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963, the gender-related provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009—the first legislation 
to be enacted in the Obama Administration—by failing to adopt some ver-
sion of paycheck fairness legislation that has been on and off the congres-
sional agenda for years.  In the U.S. Senate, there are frequently expressed 
concerns that such legislation might be unduly burdensome or lead to un-
warranted litigation—concerns that have not materialized to an excessive 
degree in states with state-level versions of the Equal Rights Amendment 
or related statutes.82  We are left to wonder whether there is a way to embed 
even more specific state constitutional provisions on this and other gender-
related discrimination issues, so that real progress might be spurred. 
 
IS HEALTHCARE A RIGHT? IF NOT, SHOULD IT BE?  
IF IT IS A RIGHT, WHAT DOES THAT MEAN? 
The United States continues to have baffling fits of agitation and 
controversy while trying to figure this one out.  Indeed, healthcare is com-
plicated, but there are many models for healthcare that have been in place 
 
81.  An excellent new treatment of the activities of newly elected 
women in Congress is JENNIFER STEINHAUER, THE FIRSTS: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 
WOMEN RESHAPING CONGRESS (2020). 
82. In Montana, the number of lawsuits brought under the state version 
of the equal rights amendment appears to be quite modest.  Mont. Const., art. II, § 4 
(2019). 
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around the world for some time now.  And there is much that can be 
learned from those experiences.83 
As things stand, we spend much more money, nearly double the 
amount of some other developed nations, for health services; and our 
health care outcomes, depending on the metric chosen, hover consistently 
in the lower, to mid to upper 20s when ranked against all other nations.84 
We can pinpoint and certainly celebrate some clear successes, but there is 
much to improve in the coverage and cost of our health care system. 
Even after passage of what has been enthusiastically and some-
times derisively called Obamacare, tens of millions of Americans still can-
not afford their next illness, or preventive care that might help them avoid 
it, maybe even save their lives.85 
If health care is a fundamental right, and I believe it is, everyone, 
regardless of wealth or income should have a decent chance to obtain af-
fordable care without fear of bankruptcy or life-threatening delay.  People 
should not have to fear being denied coverage for any one of a laundry list 
of pre-existing health conditions that afflict tens of millions of their fellow 
citizens.  Administrative costs should be held in check.  Life-time caps on 
coverage should be eliminated.  Prescriptions should be available at lower 
 
83.  See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right 
to Health Care, 12  J. CONST. L. 1325 (2010), which reviews various state provisions 
and trends in state constitutional health law, including vulnerable groups and types of 
guaranteed services and concludes that “[S]tate constitutional recognition of health, 
as well as proposed state constitutional amendments that would expressly recognize 
health rights, serve as important catalysts for federal and state legislation.” 
84.  On the costs of health care, see Rabah Kamal and Cynthia Cox, 
How Do Healthcare Prices and Use in the U.S. Compare to Other Countries?  Pe-
terson-KFF (May 8, 2018), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collec-
tion/how-do-healthcare-prices-and-use-in-the-u-s-compare-to-other-countries/; see 
also Roosa Tikkanen and Melinda K. Abrams, U.S. Health Care from a Global Per-
spective, 2019:  Higher Spending, Worse Outcomes? (January 30, 2020), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2020/jan/us-health-
care-global-perspective-2019.  On overall rankings for health care, see e.g. Aria 
Bendix, The US was once a leader for healthcare and education—now it ranks 27th 
in the world, Business Insider, (September 27, 2018), https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/us-ranks-27th-for-healthcare-and-education-2018-9; see also Sophie 
Ireland, Revealed: Countries With The Bests Health Care Systems, 2019, CEO 
World (August 5, 2019), https://ceoworld.biz/2019/08/05/revealed-countries-with-
the-best-health-care-systems-2019/, which ranks the U.S. 30th overall. 
85.  T. R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR 
BETTER, CHEAPER, AND FAIRER HEALTH CARE (2009); STEVEN BRILL, AMERICA’S 
BITTER PILL: MONEY, POLITICS, BACKROOM DEALS, AND THE FIGHT TO FIX OUR 
BROKEN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM (2015); and ELISABETH ROSENTHAL, AN AMERICAN 
SICKNESS: HOW HEALTHCARE BECAME BIG BUSINESS AND HOW IT CAN TAKE IT BACK 
(2017).   
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cost in a more competitive environment.  Insurance plans should be re-
quired to meet minimum standards of coverage.  And, of course, coverage 
they can afford should be available to everyone. 
There may be a way to enshrine a fairly detailed right to health 
care in a state constitution, thereby triggering the experiments that could 
flesh it out further.  If so, it is unlikely to be a brief provision.  And there 
will always be important and beneficial statutory approaches as well, and 
good for them; but this is a right that would likely benefit from being ele-
vated to constitutional status in states that believe in it. 
 
THE INCOMPLETE JOURNEY ON THE ROAD  
TO A FAIRER CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
It is finally becoming much more commonly recognized—even to 
a reassuring extent across party lines—that the criminal justice system has 
favored and continues to be biased in favor of the wealthy while system-
atically disadvantaging minorities and people with low incomes.86 
While there have been encouraging bipartisan steps taken in the 
recent past, and we can hope they will be built upon, as they stand, they 
fall short of what is needed to level the field and restore fairness to law 
enforcement in the states and in the nation. 
Over the past 40 years or so, for a variety of reasons, the United 
States has seen a massive increase in incarcerations—estimated by various 
sources to be between a 500% and 700% increase.87  As a result, the  
United States has the highest level of incarcerations among developed 
 
86.  MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION 
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012); and JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE 
CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION (2017).  See also Amanda K. Eklund, The Death 
Penalty in Montana: A Violation of the Constitutional Right to Individual Dignity, 65 
MONT. L. REV. 140 (2004) (citing the study published by the Center for Native Amer-
ican Studies at Montana State University, which found that Native Americans were 
sentenced more harshly than whites for similar crimes).  
87.  American Civil Liberties Union, Mass Incarceration, 
https://www.aclu.org/issues/smart-justice/mass-incarceration, (pointing to a 700% 
increase since 1970.  The Sentencing Project sets the increase at 500% over the last 
40 years, Mass Incarceration Fact Sheet:Trends in U.S. Corrections, at https://sen-
tencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf).  See 
also Alexander, supra note 86 at 6, which indicates that since 1972, the U.S. popula-
tion held in prisons and jails jumped from fewer than 350,000 to over two million; a 
similar increase in the penal populations occurred as a result of the war on drugs 
launched in the 1980s. 
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countries.  And those behind bars are disproportionately minorities and the 
less well off—quite often for drug-related and non-violent crimes.88 
Meanwhile, white collar crime prosecutions, money laundering 
investigations, even tax audits of high-income taxpayers are clearly being 
de-emphasized and too often not pursued to the full extent of the law.89  
State constitutions may be a place to address these institutional biases and 
promote a fairer system of justice. 
 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE PROTECTION  
FROM CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
 
In my Bill of Rights study, I reviewed the available literature on 
capital punishment.90  The main points I had examined prior to the Con-
vention are under even more intense discussions today.  Capital punish-
ment is not a deterrent in the states that still have it, with a total of some 
2,700 people currently on death row (the South having the highest murder 
rate and by far the greatest number of executions).  It is far less costly to 
imprison someone for life than it is to proceed to execution, with Texas 
leading the way with over 550 executions since 1976.  Capital punishment 
continues to fall more heavily on minorities, particularly, but not exclu-
sively, in the South.  Hundreds of what turned out to be innocent people 
have been erroneously incarcerated and even put to death.91 
Some states have suspended or banned capital punishment as a 
result, but it is still practiced in some parts of the country; and a sharply- 
divided 5–4 United States Supreme Court recently upheld its use in a case 
 
88.  See National Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the 
United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences, https://doi.org/10.17226/18613.  
The report notes that the U.S., with 5% of the world’s population, has the largest num-
ber of incarcerated people; that 25% of all those incarcerated in the world are in the 
United States; and that the U.S. rate of incarceration is 5 to 10 times higher than rates 
in other democracies—all of which make the growth “historically unprecedented and 
internationally unique.” 
89.  BRIAN K. PAYNE, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: THE ESSENTIALS (2d ed. 
2013). 
90.  Applegate, supra note 2, at 181. 
91.  See Death Penalty Information Center, Facts About the Death Pen-
alty, https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/documents/FactSheet.pdf, which com-
piles statistics on the number of executions and numbers of death row prisoners by 
state; death sentencing by year; studies on the deterrence effect of capital punishment; 
references to recent studies on race and capital punishment; death row exonerations; 
public opinion on the death penalty; and more. 
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that some say amounts to sanctioning a form of torture—whereby a con-
victed man in Missouri can be administered a lethal injection that results 
in suffocation in his own blood over an agonizingly long period of time.92 
The Bill of Rights Committee carefully considered a provision 
abolishing it, and the Convention even placed a prohibition on the 
statewide ratification ballot, to be voted on—like gambling—as an item 
separate from the body of the document.  In that election, the provision 
eliminating capital punishment was trounced by roughly a 2:1 margin.93 
Montana has a Declaration of Rights provision banning cruel and 
unusual punishment, as do many other states and the United States Con-
stitution.  As of 1994, hanging is no longer authorized in the state.  Other-
wise, the State Constitution has not resulted in much clarity on whether 
capital punishment is useful or acceptable.  On the plus side, of the states 
where capital punishment remains legal, Montana is the only state that has 
not handed down a death sentence in this century. 94 
 
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY POST 9/11 AND IN THE INTERNET AGE 
 
It is easy to conclude that there remains very little privacy in this 
new century—and not just because of increased government surveillance 
of U.S. and international citizens after the horrific events of September 11, 
2001.  These days, the digital technology that is such a central part of our 
lives tracks our web browsing habits, our locations, and even sifts through 
emails, documents and attachments produced or stored on our devices, 
some of which contain sensitive financial, medical or health information; 
and then uses them at least for targeted commercial marketing purposes.95 
 
92.  See Adam Liptak, Rancor and Raw Emotion Surface in Supreme 
Court Death Penalty Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2019, available at https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/04/01/us/politics/supreme-court-death-penalty.html.  Capital punish-
ment executions have risen after a precipitous drop in the early to mid-20th century.  
Some 29 states, the federal government, and the military still use capital punishment, 
with over 2,500 inmates on death row.  Attorney General William Barr has recently 
reinstated the death penalty for federal crimes after 16 years.  Montana is currently the 
only state in which judges alone can decide whether to impose the death sentence. 
93.  See Amanda K. Eklund, The Death Penalty in Montana: A Violation 
of the Constitutional Right to Individual Dignity, 65 MONT. L. REV. (2004). 
94.  State by State, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, https://death-
penaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state.  
95.  See Tony Room, Tech Titans’ Response on Data Mining, POLITICO 
(Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/tech-titans-muted-response-
on-nsa-data-mining-098373, concerning public and private sector data mining.  Of 
course, data mining is not the only concern being raised about the impact of large 
private sector technology companies in the new economy.  See, e.g., Stacy Mitchell & 
Olivia Lavecchia, Amazon’s Stranglehold: How the Company’s Tightening Grip on 
140             PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW  Vol. 43 
 
There are also privacy concerns about various devices that can 
record voices and take photos and video in-home.  Increasingly sophisti-
cated phishing, malware and other intrusions are capable of even more 
nefarious invasions of privacy.  The data collected can even be and has 
been used in microtargeting for election campaigns and to swamp citizens 
with disinformation.  It appears that some pass those messages along be-
cause they believe them; others because they know they will be damaging 
to political adversaries. 
What is tragic about all this is that there is little serious effort out-
side the European Union to get at the abuses.  Very few in the Congress 
seem concerned about it and, while it is hard to fashion state level reme-
dies, it is at least worth a try to see if a state or a group of states might 
develop a more detailed, sustainable version of the right of privacy. 
In the Montana State Constitution, the right of privacy is not to be 
infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.96  However, 
beyond whatever government agencies can do, the demolition of the right 
of privacy by private entities is occurring without any showing beyond the 
desire for increased profits from data mining. 
There is a question whether the individual right of privacy could 
also prohibit intrusions by private parties, since the explicitly stated right 
is to be abridged only on the showing of a compelling state interest—not 
presumably to be freely violated for private commercial gain, such as mak-
ing money off mining and selling or trading personal data.  While this was 
not directly contemplated in the language or intent of the provision—as 
there were at the time no ubiquitous internet or other technological means 
to easily and perpetually access the most sensitive data and information, it 
is worth considering given the magnitude of the private sector intrusive-
ness that has developed over at least the past several decades.  Even with 
the clear interstate commerce legal problems that would be encountered, 
the potential for useful state constitutional provisions should be explored. 
 
THE RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS, REFUGEES AND DEPORTEES 
 
 
the Economy is Stifling Competition, Eroding Jobs, and Threatening Communities, 
INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE (Nov. 29, 2016), https://ilsr.org/amazon-stran-
glehold/. 
96.  MONT. CONST., art. II, § 10.  Some 11 states now have explicit provi-
sions on the right of privacy, according to the National Conference of State Legisla-
tures.  See Pam Greenberg, Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/re-
search/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-
state-constitutions.aspx. 
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There is little question that border and immigration issues have 
taken on heightened importance in the minds of the public here and abroad 
and, given the likelihood of a burgeoning climate and terrorism-driven ref-
ugee crises, the difficulties are unlikely to subside.97  As a result, the rights 
of those seeking to immigrate, whether temporarily or for the longer-term; 
the status of the millions who are not properly documented living in the 
country; the future of the Dreamers who ended up in the U.S. through no 
fault of their own and have become productive participants in the eco-
nomic and social life of the nation; the horrors of those families now trag-
ically separated at the border, some perhaps permanently, whether they 
were trying to cross illegally or legitimately seeking refugee status under 
U.S. and international law—these will continue to dominate the civil rights 
controversies of the nation. 
Here again, there are some aspects of these issues that might be 
resolved by state constitutional action, particularly in border states, and in 
ways that could also influence and inform the national debate. 
 
THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND MINORITIES: AND THE 
RELATED ISSUES OF RECONCILIATION AND REPARATIONS 
 
Take a look at Nevada these days and get a glimpse of what may 
be the future of the nation in pockets of transition all across the country: a 
strong and strengthening Hispanic community that is a large part of the 
economic, political and social fabric of the state; two female United States 
Senators; a majority female state legislature; a majority female state Su-
preme Court; the first African American Attorney General in the history 
of the state; and more signs of a broadening diversity that is spreading in 
the Southwest, not just in that state.98 
Meanwhile, as we glance over the political landscape of the nation 
at large these days, we can still see staggering levels of inequality; the 
continuing scourge of poverty; the lack of adequate nutrition and educa-
tional opportunities; and more.  All, now reinforced by the seismic impact 
of the coronavirus, are forcing a renewed examination of reforms that 
 
97.  See Climate Change and Disaster Displacement, UNITED NATIONS 
REFUGEE AGENCY (2017), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/environ-
ment/5975e6cf7/climate-change-disaster-displacement-overview-unhcrs-role.html. 
98.  See Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, Where Women Call the Shots, WASH. 
POST, May 17, 2019; and Colton Lochhead & Bill Dentzer, Nevada’s First Female 
Majority Legislature Got a Lot Done, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, June 23, 2019. 
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might be implemented to address more successfully the problems of in-
digenous people, minorities, and those with low incomes and wealth.99 
Recently, the issue of reconciliation and even reparations sur-
faced, albeit briefly, in the upcoming U.S. Presidential election.  Perhaps 
we can find a way to have a public discussion of these issues.  Up North, 
Canada has undertaken a large-scale reconciliation process that covers ad-
ditional issues beyond murdered and missing indigenous women.  That 
effort may be a useful guide for similar work here in the U.S.100  And any 
reasoned approach to these matters will likely raise rights and freedoms 
issues that may benefit from state constitutional consideration. 
 
ADDRESSING POVERTY, THE RIGHT TO A LIVING WAGE  
AND THE EMERGING PROBLEM OF INSUFFICIENT EMPLOYMENT  
AND DETERIORATING INCOME IN THE AUTOMATED,  
INCREASINGLY SERVICE-ORIENTED, GLOBAL ECONOMY OF THE FUTURE 
 
While a few delegates—Chet Blaylock, George James, Bob 
Campbell and Lyle Monroe—and I had discussions where we tried to fig-
ure out how some of these kinds of issues might be addressed in the Mon-
tana Constitutional Convention, ultimately, we were unable to find trac-
tion on them.  As a result, the Montana Constitution has no provisions on 
such matters as living wages or collective bargaining. 
The U.S. currently has moved to a level of wealth and income in-
equality on a scale comparable to that of the late 19th century’s Gilded 
Age.  Three people in the U.S. now control as much wealth as the bottom 
50 percent or so of the entire U.S. population—thus, holding the same 
amount of wealth as some 165 million people.101 
 
99.  See MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1997). Since the Kerner Commission, we have known that poverty 
and racism were the key drivers of inner-city violence and a lot more.  It is not clear 
when, if ever this issue will once again be a matter of high priority at a state constitu-
tional level or anywhere else.  See also, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968). 
100.  See Honoring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future, Final Report of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015), http://www.trc.ca/as-
sets/pdf/Honouring_the_Truth_Reconciling_for_the_Future_July_23_2015.pdf. 
101.  See Noah Kirsch, The Three Richest Americans Hold More Wealth 
Than Bottom 50% Of The Country, Study Finds, FORBES, Nov. 11, 2017; See also 20 
Facts About U.S. Inequality that Everyone Should Know Stanford Center on Poverty 
& Inequality (2011), https://inequality.stanford.edu/publications/20-facts-about-us-
inequality-everyone-should-know.  See also, Kimberly Amadeo, Income Inequality in 
America, THE BALANCE (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/income-ine-
quality-in-america-3306190. 
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Meanwhile, roughly half of the U.S. population basically lives 
paycheck to paycheck and is unable to dig up enough cash or credit for 
even a few hundred-dollar economic emergency or a repair bill of any sig-
nificant magnitude—let alone handle a serious illness or other large-scale 
catastrophe.  A good bit of this widening wealth and income gap is due to 
the operation of the federal tax code over a long period of time but is also 
increased by the added impact of state tax laws.102 At least the state side 
of this could be to some extent made more equitable by state constitutional 
provisions on taxation, including potential provisions to help ensure that 
tax compliance is more vigorously pursued. 
In the past, predictions of an automation-driven evaporation of 
jobs did not materialize, at least not in the way prognosticators expected.  
However, in the foreseeable future, a changing and disrupted economy ap-
pears likely to challenge economies worldwide in meeting the employ-
ment and income needs of increasing numbers of citizens.  The fear of 
disappearing well-paying jobs is likely to be very real this time around.103 
Consider what driverless trucks and cars, combined with better 
integrated and more efficient transportation, might entail in the employ-
ment of truck drivers, auto sales personnel, the parts economy, and even 
overall levels of vehicle production and ownership.  The same may occur 
with dramatic reforms in the health insurance industry; continued declines 
in the labor requirements of the manufacturing sector; and many more.  
These and other trends are likely to raise serious questions about the edu-
cation system; the ability of a substantial portion of residents to gain access 
to adequate jobs and income; eventually affecting the ability of consumers 
to afford the products of the economy. 
McKinsey recently projected that as much as one-third of the 
workforce could be displaced from their jobs by 2030—a scant 11 years 
from now.104 An important rights issue that is materializing is the question 
whether there should be a right to a living wage job and/or basic income 
 
102.  Robert Samuelson, Trump's Tax 'Reform' Might Have Backfired, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2019, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin-
ions/trumps-tax-cut-didnt-just-disappoint-it-flopped/2019/11/19/09a59eba-0b10-
11ea-bd9d-c628fd48b3a0_story.html. 
103.  Concerning automation and other reasons for universal basic income 
or something else that will virtually eliminate poverty, see Avi Reichental, The Future 
of Joblessness No One in Silicon Valley Wants to Talk About, FORBES, Aug. 2, 2018, 
available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/08/02/the-future-
of-joblessness-no-one-in-silicon-valley-wants-to-talk-about/#b499e9522911. 
104.  James Manyika et al., Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: What the Future of 
Work Will Mean for Jobs, Skills, and Wages, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE (Dec. 
2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/jobs-lost-jobs-
gained-what-the-future-of-work-will-mean-for-jobs-skills-and-wages. 
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in order for people to survive at some reasonable standard of living.  An-
drew Stern, former President of the Service Employees International Un-
ion, and others on both the left and right have written tellingly about the 
coming crisis and ways to attempt to deal with it using a basic income of 
some kind.  And there may be other alternatives that could be pursued, 
perhaps some at the constitutional level.105 
 
LGBTQ RIGHTS  
 
It has been little short of stunning to see the changes in public at-
titudes and the recent Supreme Court ruling and other initiatives recogniz-
ing the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals—still 
among the most discriminated against and harassed people in our society.  
There is much left to be done on these issues, work that will also have 
significant constitutional implications.106 
 
THE RIGHT TO CONTROL ONE’S OWN END OF LIFE DECISIONS 
 
During the course of the Montana Constitutional Convention, 
what was then termed the right to die with dignity came up.  It was the 
subject of some of the most heated discussions in and around the Commit-
tee.  Ultimately, a provision on the subject was not included in the Decla-
ration of Rights, as it was deemed so divisive that, as was determined to 
be the case with capital punishment, it had the potential to sink ratification 
of the entire document. 
It is intriguing to see how this issue has progressed in more recent 
times—in Montana and in a number of other states (California, Colorado, 
Hawaii, New Jersey, Oregon, Washington and Vermont) that have strug-
gled with some success on it.  Montana, not without controversy, now has 
a path forward for those who, because of terminal illness, elect to end their 
lives without the indignity or pain of prolonged illness, choosing to avoid 
what is in their view a degraded, incomplete and often painful state of liv-
ing.  Part of the lower court holding in this case was focused squarely on 
the Declaration of Rights provision that expressed an inalienable right to 
 
105.  See ANDY STERN & LEE KRAVITZ, RAISING THE FLOOR: HOW A 
UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME CAN RENEW OUR ECONOMY AND REBUILD THE AMERICAN 
DREAM (2017); See also Robert Greenstein, Universal Basic Income May Sound At-
tractive But, If It Occurred, Would Likelier Increase Poverty Than Reduce It, CENTER 
FOR BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (June, 19, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/poverty-
and-opportunity/commentary-universal-basic-income-may-sound-attractive-but-if-it-
occurred. 
106.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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dignity and the right to pursue life’s basic necessities, among other 
things.107 The high court was able to reach its decision relying on the stat-
ute and chose not to decide based on the constitutional provisions ad-




We can for now leave the field of civil liberties issues and turn to 
a couple of related rights that are not so much protections as they are op-
portunities—the most fundamental of constitutional matters that are rele-
vant to the exercise of political freedoms as citizens.  These are critical if 
we are to give substance and meaning to such other freedoms as speech 
and assembly, the right to petition and even protest—to the capacity for 
citizens to take action and have a meaningful role as citizens in important 
public deliberations.  Two of the most important of these are the right to 
vote and we come again to the broader right of participation. 
 
VOTING RIGHTS, VOTER SUPPRESSION, AND WHAT SHOULD BE THE 
EASY ONE: POST-FELONY INCARCERATION RIGHTS 
 
There is so much to be said about the chronic, deepening disrepair 
in our federal, state and local voting systems, one hardly knows where to 
begin.  They are creaky, hackable, in many jurisdictions untraceable, dis-
jointed, inconsistent—the list of unflattering adjectives only seems to 
grow by the day.108 
A few things are especially notable: First, efforts to restrict the 
turnout of minorities have accelerated in recent years, particularly after the 
Supreme Court ruling that undermined the pre-clearance provisions of the 
Voting Rights Act.109  A number of states have attempted, with some suc-
cess in the face of a flood of lawsuits, to further restrict the vote, ostensibly 
to prevent voter fraud.  However, the most recent example of voter fraud 
 
107.  Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009). See also the lower court 
holding, referenced therein, that relied directly on the Montana Constitution’s right to 
pursue life's basic necessities.  While the State Supreme Court declined to reach the 
constitutional issue, the lower court ruling makes a persuasive argument that the right 
can be relied on in future holdings. 
108.  For a comprehensive and regularly updated overview of election law, 
see Richard Hasen, Election Law Blog, www.electionlawblog.org; see also RICHARD 
HASEN, ELECTION MELTDOWN (2020). 
109.  The use of the coverage formula in Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights 
Act was struck down in Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), effectively free-
ing jurisdictions from the pre-clearance strictures of Section 5 of that act. 
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was not related to a Voter ID card of some sort but occurred where experts 
have repeatedly said it is most likely, in the handling of absentee ballots. 
The Congressional election in North Carolina’s Ninth Congres-
sional District was invalidated by the State Board of Elections and had to 
be redone because a political operative shepherded a coordinated effort to 
round up absentee ballots which may have been unmarked or altered, lead-
ing to a race “won”—by a margin of about 900 votes out of some 280,000 
cast—by the candidate who allegedly hired him.  There was a new elec-
tion, and the result is beside the point.110 
Voter suppression efforts typically focus on making it harder to 
register with: requirements for sometimes odd voter identification docu-
ments; some rather astonishing purges of voter rolls due to supposed mis-
matched names, addresses or other information (resulting in tens of thou-
sands of voters being removed from the rolls, and with the widely used 
Crosscheck system allegedly reporting 200 false positives for each legiti-
mate instance of duplicate registration); additional restrictions on early 
and absentee voting; felony disenfranchisement, amounting to over 5 mil-
lion Americans being ineligible to vote because of previous convictions; 
disinformation about voting procedures (with the conservative American 
for Prosperity mailing Democrats in the Wisconsin recall election incor-
rect dates for the return of absentee ballots); inadequate resources availa-
ble on election days, leading to five, six, eight hours standing in lines for 
voters who have job demands, family conflicts, infirmities, and more.111 
Whether there can be meaningful reform that makes it easier for 
people to vote is unclear, as the issue seems to have become an unfortu-
nately hardened partisan battle nationwide.  The courts are increasingly 
required to review vote-related irregularities and allegations, often on 
short notice and right before elections.  And we are finding they might not 
be in a position to handle them—to address many of the potential denials 
of the bedrock right of suffrage. 
Of course, people may be rightly concerned about voter fraud.  
Fair enough, as there is a history of stuffed and floated ballot boxes and 
other voter fraud actions that should not be ignored.  I recall during my 
 
110.  See David A. Graham, North Carolina Had No Choice, THE 
ATLANTIC, Feb. 22, 2019. 
111.  See Dale Eisman, ’Crosscheck’ System Shuttered After Wrongly Tag-
ging Legal Voters, COMMON CAUSE (JUNE 22, 2018), https://www.com-
moncause.org/democracy-wire/crosscheck-system-shuttered-after-wrongly-tagging-
legal-voters/; see also Christopher Ingraham, This Anti-Voter-Fraud Program Gets it 
Wrong Over 99 Percent of the Time, WASH. POST, Jul. 20, 2017; see also MICHAEL 
WALDMAN, THE FIGHT TO VOTE (2016). 
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time working in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives in Wash-
ington DC, a prominent leader in Congress was asked post-election, “just 
how did you dry out all those ballots?”  He reportedly replied, “you should 
have seen how we got them wet.” 
Seriously, what is needed is an honest non-partisan examination 
of these issues and it may be, given the strong role of the states in the 
election process, that state constitutional provisions could set the bar for 
the exercise of the solemn but beleaguered right to vote. 
 
THE RIGHT OF PARTICIPATION  
AND THE FOUNDATION FOR EFFECTIVE CITIZENSHIP 
 
In the old days, there were several merit badges in the Boy Scout 
system.  If recollection serves, they were citizenship in the home, in the 
community, and in the nation.  I have them; but have not gone back to see 
if they are still in play, or what the requirements are to wear them. 
In many ways, as noted previously, this business of citizenship, of 
citizen participation was my biggest disappointment with the results of the 
Montana Constitutional Convention.  But with or without that particular 
constitutional provision, it is hard to think clearly about effective citizen 
participation in our current political environment.  The floodtide of money, 
from sources known and unknown, appears to have overwhelmed the elec-
toral system and clearly affects the quality of subsequent deliberations and 
the impact and role of ordinary citizens.112 
In the New Hampshire U.S. Senate race in 2016, decided by about 
1,000 votes out of just over 700,000 cast, the total expenditures estimated 
for the race tallied on the order of $130 million.  By 2018, estimates for 
the Florida Senate race topped $210 million; the Texas Senate race was 
pegged at some $140 million; Missouri, about $130 million; and Arizona 
came in just under $120 million.113 
 
112.  It is not surprising to learn that elected officials in Washington D.C., 
and elsewhere, do not vote and otherwise act in accord with many of the strongly held 
views of their constituents.  They have learned that they do not have to, in order to get 
re-elected, and that appears to be good enough.  See, e.g., Anne Baker, The More 
Outside Money Politicians Take, the Less Well They Represent Their Constituents, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2016; see also Asher Schechter, Study: Politicians Vote 
Against the Will of Their Constituents 35 Percent of the Time, PRO-MARKET, (Jun. 16, 
2017), https://promarket.org/study-politicians-vote-will-constituents-35-percent-
time/. 
113.  See Most Expensive Races, THE CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS 
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topraces.php?cy-
cle=2018&display=allcandsout. 
148             PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW  Vol. 43 
 
One is left to wonder what makes a U.S. Senate seat worth that 
kind of money.  The answer is not that hard to figure out, and that answer 
is part of the reason that the odds of effective citizen engagements in public 
affairs are so diminished.  
More broadly, the question is whether there are additional experi-
ments in citizen participation—town halls, ad hoc citizen councils, addi-
tional consensus-building formats—that can be tried in a reasonable set of 
experiments in an effort to break through the current divisions that plague 
even the attempt at deliberative participation in public matters. 
 
FINALLY, ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT RIGHTS OF ALL:  
THE RIGHT TO EXPECT A MEASURE OF CIVILITY  
AND A COMMITMENT TO SOME LEVEL OF TRUTH  
IN OUR PUBLIC DISCOURSE: AT LEAST NOW AND THEN 
 
In any discussion of the quality of public life, we come early to 
the matter of civility—not because it has always been the dominant char-
acteristic of American political culture; far from it.  But it may have been 
on the minds of the Constitutional Convention delegates who worked 
closely on such provisions as the right to know and the right of participa-
tion.  Even if not, it can nonetheless be seen clearly in how they conducted 
themselves in their own deliberations.  There were no temper tantrums or 
vile personal attacks, on the floor or off.  That just wasn’t how things were 
handled in those days. 
In more recent times, we have witnessed an escalation of incivility 
and it is hard to figure out why it has occurred, or what can now be done 
about it.  We are left to wonder if civility and even the foundational respect 
for such long-held values as the inquisitive role of an independent press—
generally honored even before the drafting of the Bill of Rights—are be-
coming relics of the past, no longer to be respected or defended, but to be 
trampled in the heat of electoral discourse.114 
For all the issues we have been discussing, our ability to reason 
our way through them is key and always will be.  At the heart of reason in 
public life can be found two things: speech and action.  Accurate speech 
 
114.  Montanans need not look far for this kind of behavior.  The state, no 
stranger to the bar room brawls of American politics, has once again witnessed the 
spectacle of elected officials committing acts of political assault condoned at the high-
est levels of government, and cheered even by Montanans, men and women, young 
and old.  In stark contrast is the behavior and standard of composure exhibited in the 
Montana Constitutional Convention.  It is clearly the better model—even for cam-
paign rallies. 
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and appropriate action both depend on a reasonable understanding and ap-
preciation of the available facts, and at least a modicum of assurance that 
we are all trying to deal with things that are relatively true; that is to say, 
at least not demonstrably false. 
Of course, this concern is not so easily boiled down into a consti-
tutional provision that has a clear impact.  In fact, it may be a more or less 
hortatory matter, one that we can sometimes find in our founding docu-
ments—words to inspire, to encourage, or if necessary, even to repudiate. 
Obviously, we can’t force people to seek or even respect facts.  
We can’t even compel them to try to speak the truth.  The First Amend-
ment protects speech of nearly all kinds, requiring that no laws restrict it—
with a few exceptions, including the famous commonplace: “you can’t 
shout fire in a crowded theater.” 
As Hannah Arendt observed in her illuminating writings, at best, 
truth and politics have and perhaps always will have an uneasy relation-
ship.  But, she also warned that the utter absence of a concern for truth, or 
a willingness to allow it to be muddled or gainsaid nearly full time will 
produce a dangerous situation where people end up having no clear way 
of knowing what may be right, not being able to distinguish what is rela-
tively true from what is patently false.  That inability can make effective 
citizenship nearly impossible.115 
For that reason, we can be forgiven if we wish for, even expect 
and try to demand, a much more consistent effort on the part of those par-
ticipating in public life to demonstrate a greater measure of civility; some 
modicum of interest in and adherence to facts as we can discern them; and 
some reasonable commitment and effort to rest any asserted case on a col-
orable version of the truth. 
We have already suffered mightily as a nation through a harmful, 
ultimately debilitating credibility gap with the official untruths about the 
Vietnam War, where the intelligence assessments diverged sharply from 
the policy utterances emanating from the highest levels of the govern-
ment—all revealed starkly with the courageous, at the time extralegal re-
lease of the Pentagon Papers.116  It hasn’t been the only instance where 
credibility has vanished in our public sphere. 
 
115.  See HANNAH ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC (1972) and HANNAH 
ARENDT, ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1958), generally for her views on the perils 
of a wanton lack of respect for forthrightness and its relationship to the destruction of 
public life. 
116.  See Robert McNamara et al.,  Pentagon Papers, NATIONAL ARCHIVES 
(JUNE 13, 2011), https://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers, to visit the full 
weight of the compilation that painstakingly told the revealing story of the credibility 
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Indeed, for now, having apparently learned so little from those 
times, we are overwhelmed daily by a deluge of ignorance, willful or not; 
by distortions crafted in the business of what we call public relations; by 
manipulations; and too often, by outright lies.  These degrade our public 
discourse here at home and before the stunned eyes of the world. 
If civil liberties and political freedoms are to mean much, and if 
we are to have any chance of expanding them to address the issues of the 
present and the future—to function effectively in a more democratic arena 
that promotes genuine participation and citizenship—we need to have this 
rash of dissembling rhetoric and untruthfulness come to its well-deserved 
end.  Somehow.  Or, if that is impossible, as it may well be by now, at least 




I could go on, and I see I have.  So, enough for now.  The issues 
discussed above are just a sampling of some relevant opportunities to ad-
vance the frontiers of civil liberties and political freedoms.  It should be 
clear and thoroughly obvious to those who pause to reflect, to contemplate, 
that there is potential, enormous potential, in all of this. 
The question for the years ahead, once reduced: can any of what 
we know must be undertaken; can any of it be realized—whether in state 
constitutions or otherwise?  I think the best answer is just a perhaps.  But, 
if not, what will have been missed—for real people, for men, especially 
for women and minorities, who do not have the deepening pile of money 
that will enable them to be heard and to exert a fair measure of influence; 
who do not choose to live in a world of false “facts” and outright lies, but 
who cannot seem to escape it; and who do not ask at bottom for much more 
than the full right to live out their lives with some level of guaranteed dig-
nity?  What will have been lost, yet again? 
Whether one agrees with my perspective and my selection of is-
sues and insights or not—on the topics discussed here, and those I did not 
get around to—it seems to me that some of them are the kinds of rights 
and freedom issues that somewhere, some leaders with a progressive im-
pulse might one day want to advance, perhaps as I say, in a state constitu-
tion.  To at least try to make some progress on some of them.  We can hope 
they will have a chance to do that to good effect in a public arena that is 
far and away better than the one we have to deal with now.  An arena that 
 
gap, the official lies that misdirected public understanding of the great tragedy in Vi-
etnam.  
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perhaps might even resemble the 1972 Montana Constitutional Conven-
tion and the delegates who in those days mastered their craft. 
At the end of that convention, Delegate J. C. Garlington uttered 
what have turned out to be profoundly prophetic words for the days ahead: 
 
In one sense, we have finished our labors, but in a larger 
sense we have just begun.  Ahead, I see not only the im-
minent task of ratification, but beyond that the more im-
portant task of leading our fellow Montanans into the re-
ality of better government for a better society.  That 
remains the task, and I believe the jury will always be out 
on that score.117 
 
Indeed, the jury is still out.  We are entitled, given recent history, 
to be worried about the ultimate verdict. 
Just now, I feel like I am looking up from my desk in Katherine 
Orchard’s law library, knowing that it is past time to check out. 
To wrap this up then, I think we should take a last look back—to 
a time well before the Constitutional Convention.  To one of the finest 
writers of the West; a man whose well-worn books have followed me 
throughout much of my adult life; and in whose historical archives I have 
been prowling off and on over the past several years. 
He is the one I have more than once wished could have been still 
among the living in 1972—at what would have been the ripe old age of 
67—in order to participate in the deliberations of the Convention.  His 
presence might have helped us break more trail on the path of change. 
In the 1940s, Joseph Kinsey Howard insisted on seeing Montana 
plainly, on telling the truth about the place as he understood it.  Beyond 
that, his words have made us cast more than one glance at a gorgeous land-
scape that we can hope might now and then bring out the elemental good-
ness of citizens pulled up short by the sheer beauty and the promise of the 
place where we all get to live for a time. 
I can see him sitting on the porch of his cottage near Choteau, 
gazing wearily at the end of another long day, probably with a generous 
pour of whiskey or some such.  And at peace with himself alone, knowing 
full well why he wrote what he did. 
His words are for all of us who think there are other progressive 
populist moments—perhaps to be experienced soon, perhaps somewhat 
 
117.  MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, Vol. VII, 
3026-27 (Mar. 23, 1972). 
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later—in what we hope might be a gentler and, if not, at least a more truth-
ful time in which to meet the tests of the challenges ahead.  Let’s end up 
with him.  In his days, in words that still resonate for ours, Howard wrote: 
 
There will be room for adventurers here . . . [E]veryone has 
a quarter of a square mile . . . in which to stomp about and 
shout, or just to lie and look up at the vibrant blue-green 
sky . . . The sunset holds infinite promise.  Fire sweeps up 
from behind the Rockies to consume the universe, kindles 
the whole horizon, and all the great sky is flame; then sud-
denly it falters and fades atop the distant peaks and the 
lonely buttes, ebbs and is lost in secret coulees.  The Mon-
tanan is both humbled and exalted by this blazing glory 
filling his world, yet so quickly dead; he cannot but marvel 
that such a puny creature as he should be privileged to 
stand here unharmed, and watch.  It is as if every day were 
the last of days . . . But the sun’s fierce ecstasy will return 
tomorrow night.  And next year . . .118 
 
As it will.  And in their outward mornings, especially in their time in what-
ever public arena they may find available to them, may Montanans and 
citizens elsewhere find a way to step up, to make the tough decisions that 
will have to be made, to meet those challenges that even now can be seen, 






118.  JOSEPH KINSEY HOWARD, MONTANA HIGH WIDE AND HANDSOME 
328-29 (1943). 
119.  Outward morning is my nod to the work of Dr. Henry Bugbee, who 
toiled in a contemplative life and came up with impressive philosophical insights.  
His seminal work, THE INWARD MORNING (1958), is a disciplined journal/diary of 
his reflections.  He also appeared occasionally in the public realm and his views 
were a welcome inspiration whenever he did. 
